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INTRODUCTION
A. The Problem 
Consider a hypothetical scenario in which Small Inventor, Inc., 
located in Colorado, works long hours to perfect a wristwatch-like pe-
dometer capable of wirelessly receiving calibration data from a re-
mote computer and comprising a sophisticated motion-control 
mechanism, which makes the device particularly accurate. Small In-
ventor, Inc. attends a trade show, where she is unpleasantly surprised 
to see that the market of personal fitness trackers is already saturated 
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manufacturers. The small inventor has no chance of competing be-
cause, as it turns out, current end users are more concerned with 
multi-functionality of wearable fitness devices than precision. Discour-
aged, the small inventor returns home, scales down production of mo-
tion-sensitive pedometers, and sells them to a limited number of local 
stores. 
To further exacerbate the small inventor’s frustration, two weeks 
later she receives a demand letter from a “patent troll”, alleging that 
the remote calibration component of her pedometer product infringes 
a client/server database patent and demanding that she take a li-
cense. Small Inventor, Inc. begrudgingly agrees to do so, even though 
she disagrees that wirelessly receiving instructions for calibrating a 
pedometer is anything like sending data to a server for storage in a 
database. 
The small inventor realizes that the “patent troll” sent a bulk mail-
ing to many tradeshow participants but larger companies simply ig-
nored the letter. Many of these companies are already members of 
defensive licensing programs that mitigate the risk of being sued for 
infringement.  The annual cost of participating can be as high as 
$20,000,1 which is prohibitive for Small Inventor, Inc. Furthermore, the 
small inventor, unlike large companies, would be unable to afford de-
fending an infringement action in court, so she chooses to take a li-
cense and agrees to pay an 11% royalty2 on her profits. 
In the meantime, six thousand miles away in Israel, a medical 
device company, Medical Devices, Inc., makes a scientific break-
through and invents a touchless blood glucose monitor, which 
measures a diabetic patient’s blood sugar level without drawing 
blood.3 The wristwatch-like monitor consists of an optical glucose sen-
sor and a camera. The monitor is the first of its kind, and the $8 billion-
 1.  LOT User Fee Schedule, LOTNET, http://www.lotnet.com/how-to-join-lot-
net/LOT_User_Fees.cfm (last visited Aug. 29, 2015). 
 2.  See Jonathan E. Kemmerer & Jiaqing Lu, Profitability and Royalty Rates Across In-
dustries: Some Preliminary Evidence, KPMG GLOBAL VALUATION INST. (Nov. 2012), 
http://law.unh.edu/assets/images/uploads/pages/ipmanagement-royalty-rates.pdf (the average 
2007 royalty rate in the software industry was approximately 11%). 
 3.  Medical Devices, Inc. is a fictional company created for the purposes of this hypothet-
ical. The hypothetical scenario was informed by a 2014 publication in Biomedical Optics Ex-
press, in which a team of researchers described an experimental, wristwatch-like, touchless 
glucose monitor. See Nisan Ozana et al., Improved Noncontact Optical Sensor for Detection of 
Glucose Concentration and Indication of Dehydration Level, 5 BIOMEDICAL OPTICS EXPRESS 
1926 (2014), http://www.opticsinfobase.org/boe/fulltext.cfm?uri=boe-5-6-1926&id=286417 
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a-year market in diabetes management devices4 is optimistic about 
the invention. There is, however, a problem: there is not a suitable 
motion cancellation mechanism that would make the device’s read-
ings sufficiently precise.5
Medical Devices, Inc. finds out about Small Inventor, Inc., whose 
motion cancellation technology is the missing piece to the puzzle. 
Medical Devices, Inc. is enthusiastic about acquiring the small inven-
tor’s company and its technology for use in touchless glucose moni-
tors.
Medical Devices, Inc. is unhappy when it learns of a cloud on 
Small Inventor, Inc.’s license to its intellectual property (IP) assets. 
When the inventor signed the licensing agreement, she agreed to a 
standard clause6 stating that she could not assign the right to practice 
the “troll’s” invention to anyone else. The “troll”, seeking to capitalize 
on the profit potential of glucose monitors, wants to increase the roy-
alties to 25% or, in the alternative, sue Medical Devices for patent 
infringement if it proceeds with buying Small Inventor, Inc. The medi-
cal device company’s attorneys determined that, although the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) recently criticized the 25% 
rule of thumb for setting royalties as improper,7 the holding did not 
extend to private contracts. Furthermore, the attorneys find out that 
the “troll” obtained a declaratory judgment8 stating that its client/server 
patent was not invalid.  Since invalidity is the main defense to claims 
tracking of temporal changes of reflected secondary speckles produced in the wrist when being 
illuminated by a laser beam.”). 
 4.  Mark D. Hughes, The Business of Self-Monitoring of Blood Glucose: A Market Profile,
3 J. DIABETES SCI. & TECH. 1219 (2009), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/arti-
cles/PMC2769893/.
 5.  See Ozana, supra note 3, at 1926 (“Further development is needed such as motion 
cancellation mechanism in order to [make the contactless glucose monitor] more robust.”). 
 6.  Elaine D. Ziff & John G. Deming, IP Licenses: Restrictions on Assignment and Change 
of Control, PRACTICAL L. PUBLICATION 1, 14 (2012) (licensor and licensee perspectives on as-
signability). 
 7.  Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“This court 
now holds as a matter of Federal Circuit law that the 25 percent rule of thumb is a fundamentally 
flawed tool for determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation.”). 
 8.  28 U.S.C.A. § 2201(a) (West 2010) (“In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdic-
tion . . . any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare 
the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or 
not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a 
final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.”); see, e.g., Windmoller v. Laguerre, 
284 F. Supp. 563, 566 (D.D.C. 1968) (in a declaratory judgment action to determine validity of 
patents, denying a motion to dismiss and noting that the action was consistent with the policy 
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of patent infringement,9 Medical Devices, Inc. is concerned that its 
defense would not stand. 
Medical Devices, Inc. anticipates to make a 20% profit margin10
and secure a 10% market share, which would make its annual profits 
from the sale of touchless glucose monitoring devices $160 million 
per year and would mean that the “troll” would receive $40 million, or 
25% in royalties on profits.  The “troll” is not willing to reassign the 
license on the original terms, which include 11% royalties, because it 
knows that it is likely to prevail at trial. Medical Devices, Inc. decides 
that it would be significantly cheaper to develop the motion-control 
technology in-house. 
The corporate acquisition transaction does not go through.  Small 
Inventor, Inc. eventually goes out of business because people be-
come less and less interested in pedometers, albeit exceptionally ac-
curate ones. “Patent troll” makes nothing and does not get to sue 
Medical Devices, Inc. for patent infringement because Medical De-
vices, Inc. does not acquire Small Inventor, Inc. or its technology and, 
further, develops a design-around. Diabetic patients continue to draw 
blood daily while Medical Devices, Inc. takes an additional three years 
to develop and test a motion control technology for its contactless de-
vices to get around a monopoly created by the “troll’s” patent. 
The reason for this seemingly suboptimal outcome is the unas-
signability clause in the “troll’s” license to Small Inventor, Inc. This 
Note presents an argument for relaxing these restraints on alienability 
of patent licenses by invalidating such clauses when a patent is li-
censed from a non-creative entity (NCE or “patent troll”). 
B. Legal Question 
The legal question addressed in the hypothetical supra is 
whether corporate change-of-control transactions should limit the sur-
viving entities’ ability to use newly acquired intellectual property, if 
said property was previously licensed by the acquired business entity 
from a third party that itself does not practice the licensed invention 
(an NCE). 
The answer to this question must be consistent with both contract 
law and patent law.  On one hand, contracts have been traditionally 
presumed to be fully transferable, absent express provisions to the 
 9.  35 U.S.C.A. § 282(b)(2) (West 2012). 
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contrary.11 On the other hand, courts have been reluctant to uphold 
the assignability of intellectual property licenses to third parties be-
cause of a strong policy interest in encouraging patentees to retain 
control of their inventions.12 However, the United States Supreme 
Court (hereinafter, “SCOTUS”) has acknowledged that sometimes the 
patent rights protection doctrine goes too far.13
This Note presents a synthesis of the principles of contract law, 
intellectual property law, and antitrust policy in order to find a middle-
ground approach. The proposal includes filling in the gaps in the body 
of defenses to claims of patent infringement by supplementing the 
doctrine of patent misuse, one such defense, to invalidate patent anti-
assignment clauses. 
C. Roadmap to a Solution 
Anti-assignability clauses in patent licenses, as restrictions on al-
ienability, could lead to anti-competitive practices and are therefore 
similar to practices prohibited by antitrust law. Problematically, how-
ever, there is no room in the traditional body of defenses to patent 
infringement claims or, more generally, in patent law, to provide a 
mechanism for evaluating and relaxing these restrictions even in the 
face of suboptimal economic results. This Note proposes that this gap 
in law can be resolved by grounding the argument for alienability of 
patent licenses in the doctrine of patent misuse. 
Part I discusses the economics of the issue, including the impact 
of NCE activity on operating companies. Part I also presents an eco-
nomics-based argument for judicially limiting downstream effects of 
NCE licensing activity. 
Part II introduces the legal background. Part II discusses the 
courts’ efforts to curb NCE activities, which are demonstrative of the 
courts’ readiness to consider alienability of licenses issued by NCEs. 
 11.  Cincom Sys., Inc. v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431, 437 (6th Cir. 2009) (“State contract 
law will govern the interpretation of [an intellectual property] license because a license is merely 
a type of contract.”). 
 12.  Id.; see also In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 1996) (federal law must govern 
to prevent free assignability and to promote creativity); In re Alltech Plastics, Inc., 71 B.R. 686, 
689 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1987) (“[Because the rights] of the patent owner to license the use of 
his invention is [sic] a creature of federal common law . . . [i]t follows that questions regarding 
the assignability of patent licenses are controlled by federal law.”) (internal citations omitted).  
 13.  Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126–27 (2006) 
(citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8) (“[T]oo much patent protection can impede rather than 
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SCOTUS has recently taken steps to protect the industry from weak 
patents asserted by NCEs by clarifying, for example, the require-
ments for patentable subject matter,14 indefiniteness,15 and claims of 
induced infringement.16 A discussion and analysis, in Part II, of the 
recent developments in the case law of patent litigation procedure 
shows that the proposal presented here is consistent with these de-
velopments. SCOTUS efforts, however, have not addressed the prob-
lems faced by companies that choose to license patents from NCEs 
rather than litigate against them. The recent changes in law also 
wreaked havoc on the computer engineering patent field because the 
patents invalidated by SCOTUS to curb NCE activity pertained mostly 
to computer technologies.17
Part III presents an argument, rooted in antitrust and patent pol-
icy, that anti-assignment clauses in patent licenses from NCEs con-
stitute patent misuse. The doctrine of patent misuse is reflected in the 
Princo rule: to be considered misuse, a practice first must attempt to 
unduly broaden the scope of a patent right, and second, it must be 
linked to patents in suit.18
Part IV provides a roadmap for arguing alienability of patent li-
censes to business successors. First, Part IV reconciles the proposed 
rule with case law. Second, Part IV addresses procedural aspects of 
arguing license assignability, including timing, standing, and jurisdic-
tional law. 
Part V addresses counterarguments. 
D. Intended Audience 
The topic explored in this Note is of interest to legal and econom-
ics scholars, legal practitioners in contract and patent law, and the 
courts for several important reasons. 
First, it is widely recognized that, in technology-intensive indus-
tries, intellectual property assets comprise a significant portion of a 
company’s value. For instance, while in 1929 only a third of a typical 
 14.  Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 15.  Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014). 
 16.  Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2118–19 (2014). 
 17.  See Tristan Gray-Le Coz & Charles Duan, Apply it to the USPTO: Review of the Im-
plementation of Alice v. CLS Bank in Patent Examination, 2014 PATENTLY-O PATENT L. J. 1,
http://patentlyo.com/media/2014/11/GrayLeCozDuan.pdf (USPTO withdrew over 800 applica-
tions from allowance following the Alice decision).
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U.S. company’s assets were intangible assets, by 1990, the ratio of 
intangible to tangible assets skyrocketed to approximately 63%, and 
today more than 70% of U.S. growth comes from exploitation of in-
tangible assets.19 It is therefore not surprising that there is currently a 
significant interest in the practitioner community in developing best 
practices for due diligence in corporate change-of-control transac-
tions with respect to intellectual property licenses—after all, the tar-
get’s existing license agreements encumber the target’s use of the 
subject intellectual property and could give rise to expenses in the 
form of royalties20 and, at the extreme, to infringement lawsuits.21
Second, the bargaining power of licensors is often disproportion-
ately high—in change-of-control transactions, licensors impose exor-
bitant fees of up to 100% of the original license fee if the intellectual 
property at issue is valuable to the purchaser.22 This state of affairs is 
particularly troublesome when the licensor accumulates patents 
largely for monetary gain, which many argue is the case with non-
creative entities.23
Third, there is a question of balancing existing law with policy 
considerations while optimizing legal rules to help high technology 
markets function efficiently. Although, as a society, we are prepared 
to sustain certain transaction costs involved in procuring, licensing 
and litigating patent rights if the end result is innovation that benefits 
the public at large, such transaction costs become a threat to innova-
tion when inefficiencies are exploited solely for the benefit of non-pro-
ducers.24 Such exploitations result in uncertainty in IP portfolio 
valuation, inhibit the operating capacity of inventors, and may leave 
them in the dark as to the identity of their competitors.25 For example, 
one court said, citing an accused infringer (in this case, Capital One 
Financial Corporation) in a suit brought by an NCE: 
 19.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS IN MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS xxvii (Lanning Bryer & 
Melvin Simensky eds,, 2002) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS].
 20.  Id. at 12.15. 
 21.  See, e.g., Elaine D. Ziff & Grace Del Val, IP Due Diligence Issues in M&A Transactions 
Checklist, Practical Law Checklist 3-501-1681. 
 22.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS, supra note 19, at 12.15.   
 23.  RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 79 (2013) (Judge Posner explains that 
many large IT companies spend a significant amount on simply maintaining large patent portfo-
lios for purely defensive purposes). 
 24.  Id. at 76 (noting that the current patent system provides a disproportionate reward to 
first-time inventors and through unnecessary complexity, expensive litigation and complex pa-
tent procurement rules discourages improvers from receiving protection for their inventions).   
 25.  Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-CV-00740 AJT, 2013 WL 
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[S]hell companies conceal [the NCE’s] patents so that targets have 
no idea that it is building walls of patents around their businesses’ 
and then when [the NCE] does launch its attack, its targets cannot 
assess or value its portfolio and thus among other things cannot 
determine whether they could avoid [the NCE’s] infringement 
claims by redesigning their accused products or processes.26 (in-
ternal citations omitted) 
This Note presents a comprehensive yet narrowly tailored rule to 
address the problems outlined above.27
I. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
A. Non-Creative Entities and the Software and Electronics In-
dustry
The proliferation of non-creative entities (NCEs) is considered by 
some scholars and academics the most significant problem in the cur-
rent U.S. patent system.28 NCEs acquire and enforce patents but typ-
ically do not practice them.29 Instead, they monitor the technological 
advancements made by operating entities and keep their patents 
alive through the USPTO30 application continuation process,31 mirror-
ing, on paper, the real-world innovation.32 When it becomes apparent 
that the real-world invention is about to realize commercial success, 
a typical NCE tactic is to offer the operating entity to license the patent 
 26.  Id. at *1 (however, the NCE prevailed because the court noted that the respondent 
failed to identify a patent in suit. Note that the court indicated, citing F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 
S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013), that increased licensing fees would not be allowed if they were not 
entirely related to the patent in suit or if the patentee attempted to extend its power beyond the 
term of the patent). See id. at 10. 
 27.  A streamlined solution is much needed. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 23, at 90 (Judge 
Posner points out that the current “patent doctrine  . . .  is such a tangle that even inventors 
have great difficulty understanding it”). 
 28.  Mark Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 1525 (2007). 
 29.  ROBERT P. MERGES, & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS
895 (LexisNexis, 6th ed., 2013).  
 30.  U. S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, www.uspto.gov (a US government agency that 
regulates patents and trademarks) (last modified Oct. 26, 2015).  
 31.  U. S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 211 
(9th ed. 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s211.html [hereinafter MPEP] (pro-
cedure for claiming a benefit of an earlier filing date through divisional applications). 
 32.  Lemley, supra note 28, at 2 (describing abuse by NCEs of continuation proceedings 
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held by the NCE in exchange for avoiding claims of patent infringe-
ment.33
Information technology companies are particularly vulnerable to 
NCE activity since a single patent on a component, which cannot be 
easily replaced because of complex interfaces with other compo-
nents, can give NCEs enormous leverage even when the value of the 
patented technology itself is not very great.34 For example, one study 
found that the most frequently litigated patents asserted in 2012-2014 
by ten NCEs, which collectively brought infringement claims against 
2,451 defendants, included those for geolocation, database, com-
puter user interaction, and digital fingerprinting technologies.35
B. The Economic Case for Judicially Limiting Downstream Ef-
fects of NCE Licensing Activity 
Companies often choose to license patents from NCEs, instead 
of litigating, for two main reasons. First, the costs involved in defend-
ing a patent infringement suit are significant. For example, one study 
found that infringement litigation cost small U.S. companies $11 bil-
lion in 2011.36 Second, losing in an infringement suit could lead to a 
court-ordered injunction and company shutdown.37 When patented 
technology is licensed from non-creative entities, such entities gain a 
disproportionate amount of power in directing the licensee’s change-
of-control decisions by enforcing non-assignability clauses in patent 
licenses. 
 33.  Donald J. Chisum, Reforming Patent Law Reform, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP.
L. 336, 340 (2005). 
 34.  MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 29, at 895. 
 35.  Colleen Chien, Patent Assertion and Startup Innovation, NEW AM. FOUND., OPEN TECH.
INST. 14 (Sept. 5, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2321340 (This study was commissioned by 
the U.S. Congress as part of the America Invents Act of 2011, which sought to simplify the U.S. 
patent system). 
 36.  Jeremy Quittner, Supreme Court Deals Death Blow to Patent Trolls, INC (Feb. 28, 
2015, 6:38 PM), http://www.inc.com/jeremy-quittner/supreme-court-ruling-on-patent-trolls.html 
(“Small businesses mounted 3,400 legal defenses in 2011 for patent cases, a 32 percent in-
crease over the prior year . . . . That cost to small companies was about $11 billion in 2011, also 
a 32 percent increase over the prior year. The total median awards to trolls is now nearly twice 
as high as those to legitimate patent holders, whose median reward fell about 30 percent to $4 
billion, according to a 2013 report by PricewaterhouseCoopers.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 37.  MICHAEL J. KASDAN ET AL., PRACTICAL LAW CO., PATENT INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS AND 
DEFENSES 11 (2011), http://www.arelaw.com/downloads/ARElaw_PatentInfringe-
mentClaimsDefenses.pdf. (“[T]he most powerful remedy available to a patent owner is a pre-
liminary or permanent injunction that prevents the accused infringer from importing, making, 
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Since publicly available information does not include NCE licens-
ing agreements, patent acquisition information, and cost and revenue 
data, the full economic impact of NCE activity is unknown.38 However, 
we do know that startup companies are attractive targets for non-cre-
ative entities because of these companies’ undercapitalization and 
vulnerability.39 Moreover, startup companies are also attractive tar-
gets for merger and acquisition transactions (M&A) because of their 
valuable niche technologies, and non-creative entities frequently initi-
ate their patent assertion efforts when a startup is about to issue an 
initial public offering or be acquired in an M&A transaction.40
A report commissioned by the U.S. Congress to study the impact 
of patent litigation on the U.S. economy as part of the America Invents 
Act of 2011 found that start-up companies are frequent targets for 
non-creative entities.41 This is due to the prospect of quick monetary 
gain from “nuisance” settlements and the precedential value of settle-
ments that gives NCEs additional leverage in licensing negotiations 
with larger companies.42  Approximately 75% of surveyed venture 
capitalists and 20% of venture-backed startups with patent experi-
ence had been approached by non-creative entities, and approxi-
mately 80% of the time NCE demands included a licensing 
arrangement for the startup’s own technology and 40% of the time an 
adoption of NCE-patented technology.43
Startups with information technology- and electronics-based 
products were NCE targets approximately 90% of the time.44 Even 
with value-at-risk of under $1,000,000, the average cost of litigating a 
 38.  See Public Comment by Mark Bohannon, Red Hat, Inc., FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 16, 
2013, 1:19 PM), http://www.ftc.gov/policy/public-comments/comment-00043-17 (proposing to 
send information requests to approximately 25 Patent Assertion Entities (“PAEs”), as well as to 
approximately 15 other entities asserting patents in the wireless communications sector as part 
of Project No. P131203). The author, who represents a company in the industry segment 
strongly impacted by NCE activity, supports the proposed FTC study and notes that the agency 
is uniquely positioned to collect this much needed information. 
 39.  Eric Savitz, Are Patent Trolls Now Zeroed In on Start-Ups?, FORBES (Feb. 28, 2015, 
6:45 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2013/01/17/are-patent-trolls-now-zeroed-in-
on-start-ups/.
 40.  Chien, supra note 35, at 11. 
 41.  Id. at 31.  
 42.  Id. (explaining nuisance value, (“[T]rolls know enough to peg [the] license fee just be-
low [the] cost”) and the precedential value of settlements, (“[Patent holders] go after startup 
companies to establish case precedent. Startups quickly agree to settle for a low amount be-
cause they have no money with which to stand up against an expensive legal battle. [The patent 
holder] then attacks larger companies for money, using those previously established case prec-
edents.”)). 
 43.  Id. at 13. 
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patent infringement lawsuit is $650,000.45 Because of the high cost of 
litigation, and because pending patent litigation diminishes the value 
of the entire company by as much as 20%, start-up companies 
choose, at the rate of one in five companies, to settle with NCEs rather 
than litigate with them.46
While the typical value of “nuisance” settlements and licensing 
costs are relatively small—with various estimates placing the value of 
licensing agreements at $1,000 to $50,00047 and the value of an av-
erage settlement agreement at $340,00048—the downstream effects 
of these licensing arrangements are devastating. For example, one 
likely effect of NCE activity is the loss of start-up funding. One study 
estimates that NCE activity adds operating risk and thereby nega-
tively impacts the U.S. economy by making venture capital unwilling 
to invest in start-up companies, costing the U.S. economy between 
$8.1 billion and $41.8 billion in venture capital losses over a five-year 
period.49
Another problematic effect is a cloud on the start-up’s title to its 
intellectual property assets. When a target’s technology is encum-
bered by a patent license, the first option a prospective purchaser of 
the target is likely to pursue is licensor consent to assignment, a new 
license, or a sub-license,50 which introduces significant additional li-
censing fees as a condition of the transaction. In licensing transac-
tions, the licensor typically receives a significant royalty amount—
25% of the profit generated by the licensed invention.51 While the Fed-
eral Circuit recently noted that the 25% Rule is not always appropri-
ate,52 the holding was limited to the calculation of damages and it is 
not binding on private parties negotiating a licensing contract. 
At the same time, as illustrated in the hypothetical case of Patent 
troll v. Small Inventor, Inc. presented in the Introduction, NCEs are 
 45.  Savitz, supra note 39 (citing a Report of the Economic Survey published by the Amer-
ican Intellectual Property Law Association). 
 46.  Chien, supra note 35, at 11–12, 17. 
 47.  Conversant Takes Aim at Patent Troll Demand Letters, CONVERSANT (Feb. 28, 2015, 
6:49 PM), http://www.conversantip.com/news-article/conversant-takes-aim-at-patent-troll-de-
mand-letters/.
 48.  See generally Chien, supra note 35. 
 49.  Catherine Tucker, The Effect of Patent Litigation and Patent Assertion Entities on En-
trepreneurial Activity 31 (MIT Sloan School of Mgmt., Working Paper No. 5095-14, 2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2457611. 
 50.  Ziff & Deming, supra note 6, at 9–10. 
 51.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS, supra note 19, at 4.12.   
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unlikely to permit the licensees to transfer contracts to business suc-
cessors if original royalty terms are significantly lower than what they 
are reasonably likely to recover as infringement damages.53 Because 
breaching the terms of the license and proceeding with the corporate 
sale would force licensees or their successors to internalize the cost 
of increased royalties, recoverable by NCEs in the form of damages, 
the real-world effect of anti-assignability clauses in licenses is likely a 
failure to execute the change of control or assent to an increase in 
royalties.54 Each of these outcomes is sub-optimal—the former be-
cause the public is deprived of the benefit of accessing the patented 
invention through the business successor,55 and the latter because it 
represents a transfer of profits from an operating entity to a non-pro-
ducer.
Yet another potential effect is a negative impact on the start-up’s 
valuation. If the buyer is unable to reach an agreement with the licen-
sor-NCE, the buyer will likely attempt to negotiate with the target a 
price discount for the lost value of the licensed intellectual property.56
This, in turn, will negatively impact the valuation of the target com-
pany, and the resulting loss is likely to be disproportionately greater 
than the cost of the initial licensing arrangement with the NCE. Other 
than licensing, options that the buyer is likely to pursue include seek-
ing indemnity for any patent infringement claims arising from the use 
by the buyer of licensed patents or reimbursement of the buyer’s cost 
of acquiring replacement intellectual property.57 Indemnification, not 
surprisingly, adds costs. 
An average successful start-up sells for approximately $196.8 
million.58 Combined with expected valuation loss of 20% if a patent 
 53.  35 U.S.C.A. § 284 (West 2012) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award 
the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than 
a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 54.  Juliet P. Kostritsky, Incomplete Contracts: Judicial Responses, Transactional Plan-
ning, and Litigation Strategies,, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 135, n.57 (2005) (“[T]he courts adopt 
a damage measure that forces a breaching party to internalize the costs of its breach . . . . [This] 
damage rule is efficient in the same way that strict liability rules in torts can be efficient: parties 
can estimate for themselves when it is efficient to breach [and] the breacher will take into ac-
count the damage that a court would assess and compare that amount to the benefits from 
breaching.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 55.  This is inconsistent with the goal of promoting “Science and Useful Arts.” See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 56.  Ziff & Deming, supra note 6, at 9. 
 57.  Id.
 58.  Eric Eldon, CrunchBase Reveals: The Average Successful Startup Raises $25.3 Mil-
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infringement lawsuit is pending, the cost of the initial “nuisance” li-
censing settlement with the NCE will now increase to up to $40 mil-
lion— either because negotiations will position an average licensor-
NCE to demand up to $40 million, or 20% of the target’s valuation, in 
licensing fees from the purchasing company, or because the target 
will be expected to absorb up to this amount through indemnification 
and litigation cost-sharing with the buyer.
Problematically, even in the absence of an explicit non-assign-
ment clause in a patent license between the NCE and the original 
licensor, intellectual property transfer is considered an asset sale in 
the context of corporate restructuring transactions, and, as such, the 
purchaser remains vulnerable to claims of infringement if a corporate 
transfer occurs by operation of law.59 In other words, it is nearly im-
possible to circumvent a typical anti-assignment clause in a patent 
license. 
It is unlikely that the judiciary contemplated such extreme results 
when the body of law that made licenses non-assignable was devel-
oped. It is likewise improbable that the drafters of the Patent Clause 
in the U.S. Constitution60 contemplated rewarding non-producing pa-
tent holders to this extent.61 In fact, many patents are simply ahead of 
their time, and the relaxed constructive enablement standard, which 
allows applicants to receive patents by explaining how an invention 
would work rather than producing a functioning model, was created 
to account for this possibility.62
It is, however, unlikely that the promulgators of the constructive 
enablement standard envisioned that an NCE would procure a patent 
 59.  Ziff & Deming, supra note 6, at 2 (“[W]here an IP license is silent on assignability by 
the licensee, the majority of courts have found that a licensee’s rights are presumed not assign-
able without the licensor’s express consent.”). 
 60.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 
717–18 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (Mayer, J. concurring) (“Unless we are to assume that the constraints 
explicit in the Intellectual Property Clause are mere surplusage, we are bound to ensure that 
the patent monopoly serves ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . . . This is 
the standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ignored.’”) (citing Graham v. John 
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966)) (internal citations omitted). 
 61.  Ultramercial, Inc., 772 F.3d 709 at 718 (“[T]he primary purpose of the patent system is 
to promote scientific progress, not to creat[e] . . . private fortunes for the owners of patents.”) 
(citing Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917)) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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on a pre-populated drop-down box before interactive computing de-
vices become feasible and then bring infringement actions against 
operating entities using this common technology.63
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Filling the Gaps in Traditional Defenses to Claims of Patent 
Infringement 
Non-creative entities typically bring claims of patent infringement, 
and relaxing the rules for license alienability would therefore shield 
licensors and their successors from such claims. 
Patent infringement is a statutorily defined concept.64  The United 
States Code recognizes three primary categories of patent infringe-
ment: direct infringement, induced infringement, and contributory in-
fringement.65 The concept of direct infringement is codified in 35 
U.S.C. § 271(a) and makes it unlawful to make, use, offer for sale or 
sell another’s patented invention.66 The doctrine of induced infringe-
ment is codified in 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) and prohibits actions that “ac-
tively induce[] infringement of a patent”67 when the accused infringer 
knows that a patent exists. Contributory infringement, codified in 35 
U.S.C. § 271(c), makes it unlawful to import, sell, or offer for sale a 
component that constitutes a material part of a patented invention.68
Both contributory and induced infringements require proof of direct 
infringement and impose an additional scienter requirement on the 
accused infringer.69
 63.  Soverain Software LLC v. Newegg, Inc., 705 F.3d 1333, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013), aff’d,
728 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“We conclude that the prior art . . . by clear and convincing 
evidence, rendered obvious the ‘shopping cart’ claims.”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 910 (2014); 
see also Daniel Nazer, Bad News for Patent Trolls! FTC to Look Under the Hood of the Troll-
mobile, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 28, 2015, 6:49 PM), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/06/bad-news-patent-trolls-ftc-look-under-hood-trollmobile 
(noting that a Federal Trade Commission spokesperson used this case as an example of frivo-
lous patent enforcement when FTC announced an investigation into the conduct of “patent 
trolls”).
 64.  35 U.S.C.A. § 271 (West 2010). 
 65.  Id.
 66.  35 U.S.C.A. § 271(a) (West 2010). 
 67.  35 U.S.C.A. § 271(b) (West 2010). 
 68.  35 U.S.C.A. § 271(c) (West 2010). 
 69.  Plastering Dev. Ctr., Inc. v. Perma Glas-Mesh Corp., 371 F. Supp. 939, 949 (N.D. Ohio 
1973) (discussing Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336 (1961) and 
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964)) (“The fundamental 
basis of patent law requires that a patent holder establish acts of direct infringement before 





      12/28/2015   14:43:02
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 195 Side B      12/28/2015   14:43:02
13 ONLEY FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/24/2015 9:25 PM
376 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 91:1
Traditional defenses to claims of patent infringement can be 
broadly grouped into three categories. The first category is simple 
non-infringement—that is, the accused infringer establishes that its 
actions do not meet the elements of patent infringement.70 This stat-
utorily codified category of defenses includes non-infringement, ab-
sence of liability for infringement, and unenforceability.71 This Note 
proposes linking license alienability, via a doctrine of patent misuse, 
to this category of defenses—specifically, to unenforceability—be-
cause the unenforceability defense, if sustained, does not invalidate 
the underlying patent. This is, advantageously, a narrowly tailored so-
lution. 
The second, frequently litigated, category of defenses challenges 
patent validity in view of statutory requirements for patentability.72
Likewise, this category is statutorily codified73 and includes failure to 
meet the statutory requirements of patentability on the grounds of in-
definiteness,74 anticipation75 and obviousness76 of patented subject 
matter in light of prior art consisting largely of patents previously is-
sued to the patent-holder and any third parties.77
This doctrinal body of defenses is predicated on the concept that 
a patent cannot be infringed if it is invalid, and the burden is on the 
defendant to establish patent invalidity.78 As discussed in Part II infra,
relying on patent invalidity to defend against claims of patent infringe-
ment is problematic because, unlike the enforceability-based solution 
introduced here, invalidity-based defenses result in court holdings 
that generate substantive and procedural uncertainty. 
The third category of defenses includes equitable defenses, such 
as inequitable conduct in the process of procuring a patent, patent 
exhaustion, laches, and equitable estoppel.79
 70.  KASDAN, supra note 37, at 5. 
 71.  35 U.S.C.A. § 282(b)(1) (West 2012). 
 72.  KASDAN, supra note 37, at 5. 
 73.  35 U.S.C.A. § 282(b)(2) (West 2012). 
 74.  35 U.S.C.A. § 112 (West 2012). 
 75.  35 U.S.C.A. § 102 (West 2015). 
 76.  35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West 2015). 
 77.  KASDAN, supra note 37, at 5–7. 
 78.  See, e.g., Soverain Software LLC v. Newegg, Inc., 705 F.3d 1333, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (citing the “clear and convincing evidence” standard). 
 79.  Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elec. Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008) (“The longstanding 
doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item termi-
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The doctrine of patent exhaustion is of particular interest in the 
context of NCE activity. Patent exhaustion negates infringement if the 
accused infringer shows that it has an express or implied license from 
the patentee to practice the invention.80 Equitable defenses illustrate 
the need for relaxing the rules for alienability of patent licenses. For 
example, under the doctrine of patent exhaustion, the patentee loses 
the ability to block others from using its invention after it places the 
patented article in the stream of commerce.81 This makes the operat-
ing entity-patentee unable to take advantage of the entire economic 
value chain82 and precludes recovery when, for example, purchasers 
refurbish and competitively resell the patented product.83
Thus, entities that practice their patents by making products lose 
the right to control their inventions as soon as patented articles are 
sold. On the other hand, NCEs, who do not themselves produce any 
articles based on their patents and therefore commercialize patents 
by licensing them rather than selling manufactured patented articles, 
control their patents long after these are licensed. This inequity is yet 
another reason for relaxing the rules for alienability of NCE licenses, 
at a minimum to the licensee-operating entity’s business successors. 
B. Why the Courts Are Ready to Look at NCE Contracts—a 
Historical Progression of Anti-NCE Litigation 
1. Patent Infringement Litigation 
The U.S. Supreme Court recently issued a number of decisions 
intended to limit the impact of NCE activity.  SCOTUS, in developing 
its body of precedential case law, has focused, in succession, on lim-
iting the remedies available to NCEs,84 refining the rules on whether 
and when NCE patents are infringed,85 and determining whether NCE 
 80.  Id.
 81.  Quanta Comput. Inc., 553 U.S. at 633–35 (patent rights to products that “constitute a 
material part of the patented invention” are exhausted when such products are sold). 
 82.  Timothy J. Sturgeon & Momoko Kawakami, Global Value Chains in the Electronics 
Industry 3 (The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5417, 2014), 
http://secnet087.un.org/unsd/trade/s_geneva2011/ref-
docs/RDs/GVC%20in%20Electronics%20Industry%20(Sturgeon%20-%20Sep%202010).pdf 
(“Intermediate electronics and automotive goods dominate total trade in the top-50 manufac-
tured intermediate products.” In other words, the electronics industry relies on modular financ-
ing, where a component may become more valuable when combined with other components in 
a finished product). 
 83.  LG Elecs., Inc. v. Hitachi, Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1045–46 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 84.  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
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patents are valid.86 Additionally, lower courts limited the binding 
power of contracts in technology licensing.87  It is clear that the courts 
are now well-positioned to consider a logical extension to this body of 
law by developing rules for invalidating anti-assignment clauses in 
NCE licensing contracts. 
SCOTUS first tackled remedies. In eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C., SCOTUS, following a finding of patent infringement, denied 
the plaintiff a permanent injunction because the suit arose from a non-
competitor.88 The Court affirmed that the purpose of the Patent Act 
was to protect innovation by excluding others from infringing,89 but 
employed a policy-based analysis to conclude that the status of the 
parties as competitors is dispositive on the issue of whether injunc-
tions can be granted.90 The Court grounded its decision in an equity-
based four-factor test to determine when an injunction is appropriate91
and indicated that it saw no public policy benefit in putting an accused 
infringer out of business and, by doing so, granting NCEs additional 
leverage to negotiate favorable licensing terms.92
Notably, SCOTUS held that the status of parties as non-compet-
itors is key to restricting availability of injunctive relief to NCEs. Forc-
ing the accused party to shut down operations in response to a suit 
 86.  Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014); Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. 
v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). 
 87.  See infra notes 128–30; see generally A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: SOFTWARE 
CONTRACTS 44 (2010) (noting that clauses that constitute IP misuse should be unenforceable). 
 88.  eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 396–97 (Kennedy, J., Stevens, J., Souter, J., and Breyer, J., 
concurring) (“When the patented invention is but a small component of the product the compa-
nies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in 
negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and an 
injunction may not serve the public interest.”). 
 89.  See id. at 396 (J. Kennedy, J. Stevens, J. Souter, J. Breyer concurring) (“In cases now 
arising trial courts should bear in mind that in many instances the nature of the patent being 
enforced and the economic function of the patent holder present considerations quite unlike 
earlier cases. An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing 
and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees. . . . For these firms, an 
injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its violation, can be employed as a 
bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice the 
patent.”)
 90.  See id. at 391 (majority opinion) (“According to well-established principles of equity, a 
plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant 
such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that 
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that 
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a rem-
edy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent 
injunction.”)
 91.  Id.





      12/28/2015   14:43:02
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 197 Side A      12/28/2015   14:43:02
13 ONLEY FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/24/2015 9:25 PM
2016] PATENT LICENSING IN SOFTWARE AND ELECTRONICS 379 
from an NCE arguably yields a loss to the economy without a corre-
sponding benefit.93 The proposal, advanced in this Note, to relax the 
rules of alienability of licenses from NCEs to the licensor’s business 
successors is premised on the same principle. 
In further attempts to limit the fallout from NCE activity in the in-
formation technology industry, SCOTUS tightened the standard for 
determining whether infringement occurred, making it more difficult 
for NCEs to prevail in infringement suits. For example, in Limelight 
Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc.,  the Court held that proof 
of induced infringement first required proof of direct infringement.94
The effect of this decision is a heightened standard for establishing 
induced infringement, and this effect is of particular significance to 
information technology patents, where method claims, comprising 
discrete steps, are frequently used to define patented subject mat-
ter.95 Under the standard upheld by SCOTUS, to establish infringe-
ment, it is necessary for the moving party to show that a single 
infringing actor had performed all the steps.96 The holding helped as-
sure peace of mind for technology companies that would otherwise 
be vulnerable to infringement suits because the technologies they 
make are highly interactive and many steps that take place as a mat-
ter of practicing these inventions are carried out by end users.97
In their brief supporting the petitioner, key actors in the infor-
mation technology industry warned the Supreme Court that modifying 
 93.  See id. at 396 (“In cases now arising trial courts should bear in mind that in many 
instances the nature of the patent being enforced and the economic function of the patent holder 
present considerations quite unlike earlier cases. An industry has developed in which firms use 
patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining li-
censing fees. . . . For these firms, an injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising 
from its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies 
that seek to buy licenses to practice the patent.”). 
 94.  Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014). 
 95.  35 U.S.C.A. § 100(b) (West 2015) (“The term “process” means process, art, or method, 
and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or 
material.”). 
 96.  Limelight Networks, Inc., 134 S.Ct. at 2117.(“[A] method’s steps have not all been per-
formed as claimed by the patent unless they are all attributable to the same defendant, either 
because the defendant actually performed those steps or because he directed or controlled 
others who performed them.”). 
 97.  Kimberly Atkins, Supreme Court Rulings Could Create Issues for Patent Trolls, NEW 
ENGLAND IN-HOUSE, http://newenglandinhouse.com/2014/07/15/supreme-court-rulings-could-
create-issues-for-patent-trolls/#ixzz3KOrL3E4D (last visited Aug. 2, 2015) (“If [the lower court, 
to which the case was remanded] upholds the single-actor standard, it will be good news for 
software companies like Microsoft, one of many amici that filed briefs in the case. Those briefs 
expressed concern that under a different standard, companies could face infringement suits 
even if they were unaware of customer actions that could be seen as implementing certain steps 
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the single-actor standard would increase both uncertainty and com-
plexity in discovery and would thus encourage abusive infringement 
litigation and force the settlement of even non-meritorious claims.98
SCOTUS clearly agreed with this argument when it held for the peti-
tioner.
The Supreme Court, during the 2014 term, also attempted to clar-
ify the standards of patentability and made it easier for accused in-
fringers to challenge NCE infringement claims by advancing a 
defense of patent invalidity. For instance, in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig 
Instruments, Inc., SCOTUS clarified the standard of definiteness in 
claim language,99 and in Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, SCOTUS 
took steps to limit the subject matter that is eligible for patenting.100
While the Supreme Court should be commended for its efforts to 
limit NCE activity, the body of precedential law illustrated by its recent 
decisions is not yet complete.  Under eBay, NCEs can still seek mon-
etary damages. Under Limelight, pharmaceutical companies, another 
industry that drives innovation, are left unable to bring valid claims of 
infringement against copycats who change the drug delivery mecha-
nism by splitting the practice of the invention between the manufac-
turer and the end user. Finally, the Nautilus and Alice decisions have 
been welcomed in the information technology sector but they still re-
quire accused infringers to put up an expensive defense. Todd Moore, 
a member of the Application Developers Alliance and CEO and 
Founder of TMSOFT, an application publisher for mobile devices, 
commented on the Alice decision: “This ruling is definitely a win and I 
hope the USPTO will stop issuing patents on abstract ideas.  But what 
 98.  Brief for Google, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Limelight Networks, 
Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (Mar. 3, 2014) (No. 12-786), at 16 (“Far-reaching 
discovery into the geographically, temporally, and functionally disparate operation of unrelated 
suppliers of complementary goods and services will provoke settlements driven by cost rather 
than the merits of the parties’ claims.”). 
 99.  Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014) (“[W]e read § 
112, ¶ 2 to require that a patent’s claims, viewed in light of the specification and prosecution 
history, inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable certainty. 
The definiteness requirement, so understood, mandates clarity, while recognizing that absolute 
precision is unattainable.”). 
 100.  Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2356 (2014) (holding that the 
concept of intermediated transaction settlement embodied by the patented system is an abstract 





      12/28/2015   14:43:02
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 198 Side A      12/28/2015   14:43:02
13 ONLEY FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/24/2015 9:25 PM
2016] PATENT LICENSING IN SOFTWARE AND ELECTRONICS 381 
about the thousands that were already issued? It’s too expensive to 
let companies fight every bad patent out there.”101   
Indeed, litigating bad patents is expensive because a USPTO-
issued patent is presumed valid,102 and a successful invalidity de-
fense requires proof “by clear and convincing evidence.”103 The solu-
tion proposed in this Note avoids problems associated with high costs 
of litigating patents because the argument for alienability of patent li-
censes issued by NCEs is tailored precisely to avoid the litigating is-
sue of patent validity. 
2. Problems with Invalidity Based Defenses to Claims of In
fringement
Two main problems with the recent judicial trend of invalidating 
patents to dispose of claims of infringement are substantive and pro-
cedural uncertainty. The proposal advanced in this Note avoids these 
problems because it focuses on patent unenforceability as to the li-
censee or its successor rather than invalidity. 
As to substantive uncertainty, an adverse effect of Nautilus, Alice
and their progeny is the uncertainty they have introduced by changing 
the rules of patentability. In Alice, for example, SCOTUS held that the 
concept of intermediated transaction settlement embodied by a pa-
tented computer system was an abstract idea and is therefore un-
patentable in the absence of factors that would amount to 
“significantly more” than a mere idea.104 The holding allowed an ac-
cused infringer to prevail over an NCE’s claim of patent infringement 
by arguing that the NCE’s patent was invalid. 
On the flipside, the holding drastically impacted patentability of 
software inventions, especially in the financial services industry. 
Within two months of the Alice decision, USPTO withdrew 830 previ-
ously granted patents from allowance105 even though these patents 
101.  U.S. Supreme Court Software Patent Decision: What Alliance Members Are Saying,
APPLICATION DEVELOPERS ALL. (June 20, 2014), https://www.appdevelopersalli-
ance.org/news/2014/6/20/us-supreme-court-software-patent-decision-what-apps-alliance-
members-are-saying. 
 102.  35 U.S.C.A. § 282(a) (West 2012). 
 103.  Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship., 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2246 (2011). 
 104.  Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2353. 
 105.  Gray-Le Coz & Duan, supra note 17 (assignees with the most withdrawals of allow-
ances included technology and financial services giants IBM, Microsoft, eBay, IGT, and JPMor-
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were directed to processes, which is a statutorily patentable cate-
gory.106 CAFC followed Alice by invalidating patents directed to image 
data processing and correlation,107 algorithm processing in online 
gaming,108 and online transaction processing.109 Prior to Alice, similar 
technologies were found patent-eligible.110
The Alice rule did not provide a clear standard for evaluating pa-
tent-eligibility of software and online technologies. Following the Alice
decision, patent claims directed to online advertising technologies 
were invalidated in Ultramercial v. Hulu, LLC in part because they 
contained “insignificant data gathering steps”,111 yet similar claims 
were upheld in DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P. because the 
abstract idea was not easily identifiable from the patent claim at is-
sue.112 Post-Alice, the strength of patents directed to computer tech-
nologies appears to rest not in the inventive value of the patented 
systems, but rather in the patent drafter’s skill to avoid describing the 
systems as abstract ideas. Arguably, the Alice approach to patent in-
validity results in a high degree of uncertainty in the industry because 
numerous patents drafted and issued pre-Alice may be found ineligi-
ble.
Another problem with Alice-like defenses to infringement, which 
are based on patent invalidity, is procedural uncertainty. Findings of 
invalidity require the court to construe patent claims to determine the 
scope of the patented invention.113 However, courts, sympathetic to 
accused infringers, recently introduced procedural shortcuts aimed at 
avoiding the question of patent validity, including modification of the 
evidentiary standard and issuing decisions of invalidity without formal 
claim construction hearings.  
For example, in Bose Corp. v. SDI Tech., CAFC held that a sum-
mary judgment of non-infringement was appropriate if the accused 
 106.  35 U.S.C.A. § 103 (West 2015). 
 107.  Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344,1347 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
 108.  Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App’x 1005, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 109.  buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 110.  See, e.g., SiRF Tech v. ITC, 601 F.3d 1319, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (a method for cal-
culating an absolute position of a GPS receiver). 
 111.  Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing CyberSource 
Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). 
 112.  DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 113.  Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (“We hold that the 
construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province 
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infringer relied in good faith on counsel’s opinion114 that the opposing 
party’s patent was invalid.115 Similarly, in Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco 
Sys., Inc.,116 CAFC disposed with the “clear and convincing evidence” 
requirement to prove invalidity by using the accused infringer’s good-
faith belief that the patent was invalid as a basis for a finding of no 
infringement liability.117 As a result, the “clear and convincing evi-
dence” standard is now grounded in the accused infringer’s subjective 
belief118 rather than in invalidity of a patent in light of its claims.119
Finally, courts have increasingly relied on USPTO grant of inter 
partes reviews, which USPTO grants when “there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one] 
of the claims challenged in the petition,”120 as evidence of good-faith 
belief that the accuser’s patent is invalid. However, this is not a good 
proxy because USPTO grants such review more often than not and 
because a mere likelihood of invalidity may not translate to a finding 
of invalidity at trial. USPTO appears to recognize this as a problem 
because the number of inter partes review petitions that have been 
denied has been steadily increasing: in FY 2013, 13% of such peti-
tions were denied; in 2014, this number increased to 25%, and in FY 
2015, it further increased to 29%.121
Another recent decision indicative of procedural uncertainty is 
CAFC’s finding of patent invalidity in Ultramercial v. Hulu, LLC122 dis-
cussed supra. The court, in reviewing a district court’s dismissal for 
 114.  Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389–90 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds by In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 
2007)) (accused infringer has a “duty to seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel 
before the initiation of any possible infringing activity”). 
 115.  Bose Corp. v. SDI Techs., Inc., 558 Fed. App’x. 1012, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 116.  Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2013), reh’g denied
(Oct. 25, 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 704 (2014) and cert. granted in part, 135 S. Ct. 752 
(2014). 
 117.  Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 2015 WL 394343 (2015) (No. 13-896), at 14 (“By permit-
ting an inducer to avoid liability by virtue of a good-faith belief of invalidity, the Federal Circuit 
provides a pathway by which one accused of inducement may effectively assert an invalidity 
defense that runs up against no presumption of validity, and that can be established on evidence 
that is less than ‘clear and convincing.’ As demonstrated by the facts of this case, an inducer 
may avoid liability by a mistaken belief of invalidity. So long as it is held in good faith, the in-
ducer’s invalidity defense can be entirely meritless.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 118.  Id.
 119.  Id.
 120.  35 U.S.C.A. § 314(a) (West 2012). 
 121.  U. S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS
(2015),  http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-06-30%20PTAB.pdf. 
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failure to state a claim, issued a holding that an NCE’s patent was 
invalid123 in the absence of a claim construction hearing.124 In 1996, 
SCOTUS, in Markman, held that claim construction is a question of 
law, and, following this decision, Markman hearings, or proceedings 
solely limited to determining the scope of patent claims at issue and 
distinct from proceedings on infringement, became common practice. 
Markman hearings125 provide an opportunity for both sides to intro-
duce technical experts and evidence to aid in claim construction126 on 
“case dispositive” claim terms.127
The decisions discussed above represent impressive judicial ef-
forts to limit NCE activity.128 The resulting procedural uncertainty, 
however, is a significant drawback of relying on patent invalidity to 
challenge infringement claims because it renders legal analysis im-
precise, as in Commill, and makes the judicial decision-making pro-
cess less transparent, as in Ultramercial. This, although reducing the 
cost of litigation, may diminish the value of patents for the industry. 
On the other hand, addressing the relationship between NCEs and 
accused infringers in the context of their contractual relationship with-
out viewing such relationships through the lens of the NCE patent 
would avoid these problems.
3. Patent Licensing Litigation 
When courts make it easier to legally challenge and wholly or 
partially invalidate licensing agreements, NCEs lose incentives to en-
ter into these contracts. As such, promoting license alienability will 
help accomplish several important objectives. First, the problem of 
 123.  Id. at 714. 
 124.  See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (holding that 
claim construction is a question of law). 
 125.  John D. Love, U.S. Magistrate Judge, U. S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Tex., Standing 
Order Regarding Letter Brief and Briefing Procedures for Early Markman Hearing/Summary 
Judgment of Non-Infringement Requests (Jan. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Standing Order], 
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin2/view_document.cgi?document=21674. 
 126.  En Liung Huang v. Auto Shade, Inc., 945 F.Supp. 1307, 1308 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (“Expert 
testimony upon this question is both permissible and appropriate if the court finds it to be of 
assistance in reaching its determination of the meaning of the language of the patent.”) (citing 
Markman  v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), aff’g, 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 
1995)). 
 127.  See Standing Order, supra note 125 (limiting claim construction requests to no more 
than three “case dispositive” terms). 
 128.  Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 718 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (J. Mayer citing 
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511) (1917) (explaining 
that “the primary purpose” of the patent system is to promote scientific progress, not to 
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existing bad patents will cease to exist because the parties will be 
able to challenge the license agreement rather than patent validity. 
This, in turn, will promote certainty and stability within the patent sys-
tem. Second, the costs of litigation and the burdens on the court sys-
tem will significantly diminish. Furthermore, companies that purchase 
intellectual property assets where the title is encumbered by a license 
with an NCE will be less likely to infringe and will therefore not be 
subject to monetary damages. This, in turn, will strengthen their ne-
gotiating position with NCEs. 
Courts have already successfully undertaken the task of invali-
dating some aspects of intellectual property licensing contracts by, for 
example, disfavoring non-producers when defining succession rights 
to IP assets in bankruptcy proceedings and by limiting the doctrine of 
licensee estoppel. Licensee estoppel disfavors operating entities in 
comparison to NCEs by limiting the reach of patents held by operating 
entities to the products they sell. 
In Rates Tech., Inc. v. Speakeasy, Inc., the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that a no-challenge 
clause in a settlement agreement is unenforceable if settlement oc-
curs before litigation.129 In Stanford v. Roche and Preston v. Marathon 
Oil Co., CAFC held that a contract presently assigning future inven-
tions takes precedence over a contract promising to assign such 
rights in the future.130 These holdings granted more control over the 
patented subject matter to the inventor and its business successor, 
thus diminishing the amount of power given to intermediaries, such 
as the “patent troll” introduced in the beginning of this Note, who do 
not contribute to the creative process. 
Another important development, aimed at discouraging licensing 
attempts by NCEs, is the recent trend in judicially limiting the power 
of patent holders to argue licensee estoppel to foreclose the other 
party from advancing infringement defenses. 
NCEs routinely threaten infringement litigation to coerce operat-
ing entities to license because patent invalidity is one of the primary 
 129.  Rates Tech., Inc. v. Speakeasy, Inc., 685 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. 
Ct. 932, 184 (2013); but see Indus. Eng’g & Dev., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., No. 
8:12-CV-691-T-24-MAP, 2014 WL 4206584 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2014) (holding that a no-chal-
lenge clause was enforceable; however, note that here at issue was a claim for breach of a 
cross-licensing agreement). 
 130.  Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 
832 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011); Preston v. Marathon Oil Co., 684 F.3d 1276 
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defenses to claims of patent infringement, and the doctrine of licensee 
estoppel prevents licensees of patents from challenging patent valid-
ity.131 The Supreme Court attempted to optimize this legal rule in Lear,
Inc. v. Adkins, noting that the interest in protecting property rights 
granted by a patent must be balanced against the need to remove 
invalid patents from the patent system so that only valuable inventions 
are protected.132 The lower courts subsequently narrowed the Lear
doctrine when they held it to be inapplicable to patent assignment 
agreements, consent judgments, and litigation settlement agree-
ments.133 The lower courts also held that, in order to bring an action 
seeking a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity, the licensee first 
had to repudiate the licensing agreement by, for example, failing to 
pay royalties.134
Lower court decisions were favorable to patent-holders, including 
NCEs. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the trend of limiting 
the Lear doctrine when, in 2007, the Court relaxed the standing re-
quirements in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. and held that pa-
tent licensees did not need to repudiate or breach a licensing 
agreement in order to challenge the validity of the licensed patent.135
SCOTUS thus demonstrated that it was ready to carve out an excep-
tion to the doctrine of licensee estoppel by disallowing licensors to 
seek immunity from patent validity challenges when they enter licens-
ing agreements. NCEs could no longer enter licensing agreements to 
shield themselves from litigation by licensees. 
The MedImmune decision discouraged NCEs from aggressively 
pursuing patent licensing.136 In an apparent effort to further discour-
age NCEs from attempting to collect licensing fees on possibly weak 
 131.  Ronald A. Bleeker & Michael V. O’Shaughnessy, One Year After Medimmune-the Im-
pact on Patent Licensing & Negotiation, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 401, 402 (2008).  
 132.  Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 664 (1969). 
 133.  See Bleeker & O’Shaughnessy, supra note 131 (“[T]he Federal Circuit has repeatedly 
narrowed and limited the ruling’s scope. For example, subsequent decisions held that Lear only 
applied to patent license agreements and not to patent assignment agreements or to consent 
judgments in patent cases. In addition, the courts held that Lear did not apply to litigation set-
tlement agreements.”). 
 134.  Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004), abrogated by
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007). 
 135.  MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 135 (2007) (“Promising to pay 
royalties on patents that have not been held invalid does not amount to a promise not to seek a 
holding of their invalidity.”).  
 136.  PATENT REFORM AS IT APPLIES TO NON-PRACTICING ENTITY PATENT LITIGATION, AM. BAR
ASSOC., http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/intellectual_prop-
erty_law/archive/2012/patentreform-as-itapplies.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2015) 
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patents, CAFC extended the Medimmune holding in SanDisk Corp. v. 
STMicroelectronics, Inc. when it held that protracted licensing negoti-
ations gave the prospective licensee the necessary standing to chal-
lenge the underlying patent’s validity without even having to enter a 
licensing agreement with an NCE.137 A similar effort was undertaken 
by USPTO when it introduced inter partes proceedings where any 
party may challenge a patent.138
In summary, it is apparent that, first, courts did not favor non-
producers in their recent decisions; second, courts wanted to give li-
censee operating entities more freedom to seek legal redress against 
NCE tactics; and third, courts signaled that taking licenses from NCEs 
does not completely extinguish the rights of operating entities. It is 
logical for the courts to now focus on developing a principled ap-
proach to determining when anti-assignment clauses in intellectual 
property licensing agreements are invalid. 
III. LEGAL THEORY
This Note proposes extending one of the traditionally available 
defenses to claims of patent infringement, the doctrine of patent mis-
use, to facilitate acquisition by a third-party of technology licensed 
from NCEs. The proposed mechanism for expanding this doctrine is 
a rule for invalidating anti-assignment provisions and covenants not 
to sell, which are typically present in intellectual property licensing 
agreements. The proposed rule addresses scenarios where, in a cor-
porate restructuring (for example, M&A) transaction, the target’s as-
sets are encumbered by such licensing agreements. A synthesis of 
the concepts of patent unenforceability, patent misuse, and antitrust 
policy is used to arrive at the proposed analytical result. 
The following sections will present the proposed rule and discuss 
a policy-based approach for reconciling the legal frameworks of pa-
that once they lock up the license, the licensee can’t challenge the patent’s validity. This takes 
some of the pressure off companies to investigate the validity before entering the contract, but 
licensors can still use provisions such as upfront license payment, forum selection clauses, 
licensor’s right to attorney’s fees from a successful defense of the patent.”). 
 137.  SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (hold-
ing that prospective licensee had standing to challenge the patent because “[the patent holder] 
has engaged in a course of conduct that shows a preparedness and willingness to enforce its 
patent” even in the absence of a direct threat to sue the prospective licensee for patent infringe-
ment). 
 138.  MPEP, supra note 31, at § 2609 (“Any third party requester can request inter partes
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tent, contract, and antitrust to the extent these theories inform the pro-
posal for upholding alienability of patent licenses under the doctrine 
of patent misuse. 
A. Summary of the Proposed Rule 
As stated in Princo v. Int’l Trade Comm.,139 patent misuse is an 
attempt to unduly extend the scope of the patent right in a manner 
that has anti-competitive effects and in the presence of a clearly iden-
tifiable patent at issue.140 Mere “misuse in the air” is not sufficient.141
The rule proposed here supplements the Princo rule. The pro-
posed rule can be summarized as follows: first, refusal by NCE-
patentees to assign licenses to the licensee’s business successors 
on the same terms constitutes patent misuse in light of the Princo rule 
because NCE licensing activity is an attempt to unduly extent the 
scope of a patent; and, second, case law establishes that patent mis-
use renders the underlying patent unenforceable as to the licensee or 
its business successor. As illustrated below, each analytical step in 
the proposed rule is informed by policy considerations and case law. 
The proposed rule solves several problems. The rule focuses on 
patent unenforceability, providing a narrowly tailored solution. It is 
consistent with the principle, found in patent law, of avoiding disrup-
tions to limited-term monopolies secured by patents142 because the 
NCE is free to continue to receive royalties from the licensee’s busi-
ness successor. Also, the proposed rule is consistent with freedom of 
contract143 because the underlying contract is not invalidated and be-
cause the proposed rule supplements rather than overrides contract 
interpretation principles and applies only to federally adjudicated is-
sues of patent licenses.144 Finally, the rule is mindful of the distinction 
between productive and non-productive entities insofar as such dis-
tinction relates to their competitor status, which is a principle rooted 
in antitrust policy. 
 139.  Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 140.  Id. at 1318–34. 
 141.  Id. at 1329. 
 142.  Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979). 
 143.  See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).  
 144.  Karen E. Sandrik, Formal but Forgiving: A New Approach to Patent Assignments, 66 
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B. The Princo Rule as a Starting Point 
Patent misuse is an attempt to unduly extend the scope of the 
patent right in a manner that has anti-competitive effects and in the 
presence of a clearly identifiable patent at issue.  Mere “misuse in the 
air” is not sufficient. We adopt this rule because it provides a clear 
roadmap and illuminates critical analytical components of interest with 
respect to NCE licensing activity: effect on the reach of the patent 
monopoly, non-producer status of NCEs, and focus on NCE activity 
after such entities procure patents. 
C. Policy Considerations to Supplement the Princo Rule Analy-
sis
1. Patent 
In order to develop a viable solution to the problem of unduly re-
strictive licensing agreements, it is necessary to understand the policy 
objectives that underlie patent law. The doctrine of patent law is pri-
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invention; and third, assuring that innovative ideas do not remain in-
definitely in the private domain.145
Our proposal does not disrupt these objectives. Promoting alien-
ability of patent licenses from licensee-operating entities to their busi-
ness successors is consistent with the principles of patent law. The 
principle of discouraging patentees from retaining a long-time monop-
oly on their invention is not disrupted because, when a license is 
transferred to a business successor, such successor should be able 
to assume the original licensee’s contractual obligations to the NCE.  
 Furthermore, invention is still rewarded because the NCE retains 
the ability to maintain its royalty stream from the business successor, 
but on the same terms as those of the original license, and the value 
of protecting inventive activity through patents is preserved because 
patent misuse is linked to the question of enforceability rather than 
validity of patents. Therefore, the proposal avoids disrupting the pa-
tent system because it does not invalidate the patent that underlies 
the license. 
To understand NCE activity, it is further necessary to distinguish 
between the doctrines of patent law and real property law. In direct 
contrast with patent law, which seeks to harmonize the interests of 
the public with the interests of the individual, real property law is pri-
marily concerned with an individual’s right to exclude others.146 Alt-
hough recent scholarship attempted to refocus the property doctrine 
on relationships rather than boundaries, it is still arguably true that the 
focus in real property law remains on relationships between private 
parties,147 whereas in patent law, the focus is on the relationship be-
tween the inventor and the public.148 An important consequence of 
this distinction is that the grant of a patent is viewed as a bilateral 
contract between an individual and society, where a limited-term mo-
nopoly right is granted in exchange for disclosure.149 At the same 
time, patent monopoly must serve a useful end, and NCEs do not 
further this objective because they do not practice their patents. 
145.  Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262. 
 146.  Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998) 
(arguing that a right to exclude is a sine qua non in property law). 
 147.  JOSEPH W. SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 39 
(Wolters Kluwer 6th ed. 2014) (legal rights as jural relations among people); Gregory S. Alex-
ander, Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right? The German Example, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 733, 748 (2003) (discussing the “social obligation” of ownership in German jurisprudence). 
 148.  MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 29, at 627, n. 2.  
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2. Contract 
It is also important to be aware of the differences between the 
contract law doctrine and patent law while keeping in mind that the 
contract doctrine alone cannot be used to uphold license alienability 
because it protects freedom of contract and does not provide de-
fenses to contract formation that would apply in the NCE licensing 
context.
The contract law doctrine, other than requiring that the parties 
conform with the principles of good faith and fair dealing,150 seeks to 
protect the freedom of individuals to craft their own terms so as to 
maximize the private right to contract.151 Contract law therefore offers 
very few mechanisms for rendering a contract unenforceable—
namely, mistake, unconscionability, and duress.152 When courts use 
the principles of contract law to adjudicate disputes in patent licens-
ing, licensees cannot effectively rely on any of these doctrines to in-
validate unduly restrictive non-assignment clauses.153 These 
doctrines are often predicated on the imbalance of power between 
the licensor and the licensee,154 and courts are unlikely to find a power 
inequity where both parties to a transaction are equally sophisticated 
business entities.155
Therefore, the licensees are left with the only viable option—chal-
lenging the validity of the patent itself. This option, however, is expen-
sive to litigate, and, furthermore, court decisions wreak undue havoc 
on the patent industry. Instead, this Note proposes an approach that 
 150.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). (“Every contract imposes upon 
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”) 
 151.  But see generally W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (freedom to 
contract is subject to restraints imposed by public policy unless the imposition of such restraints 
as against individuals is unconstitutional). 
 152.  Lorelei Ritchie, Reconciling Contract Doctrine with Intellectual Property Law: An Inter-
disciplinary Solution, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 105, 156 (2008-2009) (citing 
Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 923 (Mich. 1887) (mistake); Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral 
Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533, 535 (N.Y. 1971) (duress); Wollums v. Horsley, 20 S.W. 781 (Ky. 1892) 
(unconscionability). 
 153.  See Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 779 F.3d 
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (attempts by NCE to license patents do not amount to extortion). 
 154.  ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 509 (LexisNexis, 4th 
ed. 2007) (contract law generally enforces only voluntary, informed agreements between men-
tally competent adults).   
 155.  Id.; see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746 (2011) (deferring 
to state law to interpret unconscionability and noting that a finding of unconscionability required 
undue “oppression” or “surprise”); Agri-Mark, Inc. v. Niro, Inc., 233 F.Supp.2d 200, 212 (D. 
Mass. 2002) (a high contractual limitation on damages was not unconscionable because both 
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would allow the courts to invalidate unduly restrictive non-assignabil-
ity clauses in patent licensing agreements. 
As discussed above, a license is a contract governed by the prin-
ciples of contract law.156 However, standard defenses to contract for-
mation, which allow a licensee to ask the court to invalidate an unduly 
restrictive license agreement, are unlikely to apply. For example, the 
unconscionability defense to contract, as articulated in Seabrook, re-
lied on the facts that one party “(1) possessed superior legal 
knowledge and (2) a scarce commodity that [the other party needed], 
(3) knew [the other party] had not read or understood, nor (4) received 
legal counsel regarding (5) the legally technical terms in (6) the fine 
print of the [offending party’s] (7) lengthy contract.”157 Clearly, a li-
cense agreement between two business entities is unlikely to have 
been formed under the conditions that meet these criteria and, in fact, 
non-assignability clauses, no-challenge clauses, and similar provi-
sions are standard tools of the trade in crafting licensing agreements 
for both the contract and patent attorneys.158
3. Antitrust 
To supplement the law of contracts, which alone does not provide 
mechanisms to support alienability of patent licenses to business suc-
cessors, a viable analytical framework is needed that would allow the 
courts to correctly take into account the public-policy dimension of 
patent law. One such exemplary framework is antitrust-based. 
Under antitrust law, “an illegal provision in a patent license will 
generally constitute patent misuse, which, as a matter of patent law, 
renders the patent unenforceable.”159 Also, and more significantly, the 
presence of an illegal provision in a licensing agreement may invali-
date the agreement itself without invalidating the underlying patent.160
 156.  McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing Power Lift, 
Inc. v. Weatherford Nipple-Up Sys., Inc., 871 F.2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“A [patent] 
license agreement is a contract governed by ordinary principles of state contract law.”)). 
 157.  SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 154, at 510 (summarizing the Seabrook unconscionability 
criteria).
 158.  See Ziff & Deming, supra note 6. 
 159.  LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS 
AND MONOPOLIES § 4:56 (4th ed. 2010) (citing E. Venetian Blind Co. v. Acme Steel Co., 188 
F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1951)). 
 160.  Id. (discussing Sanford Redmond, Inc. v. Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., No. 85 Civ. 
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Antitrust law seeks to level the playing field for producers with the 
ultimate goal of benefiting the public.161 Therefore, as a matter of an-
titrust law, a business practice, which in itself may be lawful and ap-
propriate from a business perspective, could be considered unlawful 
if it is part of an unlawful scheme.162 Furthermore, the term “anti-com-
petitive” is reserved for lawsuits that seek socially undesirable exclu-
sion,163 and it therefore fits well in a scenario where NCEs wield a 
disproportionate amount of power over other parties’ economic trans-
actions.  Consider the hypothetical presented in the Introduction su-
pra: the “patent troll” included in its agreement with the small inventor 
a term so restrictive that it effectively gave the “troll” undue control 
over the small inventor’s ability to sell its motion-control mechanism, 
an invention only partially related to the “troll’s” data transfer patent, 
to Medical Devices, Inc. The Israel-based company was therefore un-
able to enter the U.S. market. 
The policy principles that underlie antitrust law are consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s recent decisions, discussed in Part II, to 
limit the reach of NCEs by disfavoring non-producers in patent in-
fringement disputes. For example, echoing the industry feedback in a 
2012 congressional hearing on antitrust,164 the International Trade 
Commission (ITC) recently introduced a pilot program to determine 
whether NCEs meet the domestic industry requirement needed to 
bring an infringement suit in the ITC administrative forum.165
Additionally, the ITC tightened the domestic industry requirement 
in a judicial decision requiring that NCEs, in addition to demonstrating 
 161.  See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2232 (2013) (citing 
United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308-311 (1948)) (“[I]n Line Material . . . the 
Court held that the antitrust laws forbid a group of patentees, each owning one or more patents, 
to cross-license each other, and, in doing so, to insist that each licensee maintain retail prices 
set collectively by the patent holders.”). 
 162.  The licensee and its successor are also subject to antitrust regulation. See
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSETS, supra note 19, at § 16.4. However, it is unlikely that the licen-
see, typically a small entity, and its business successor would be direct competitors “in the ab-
sence of the licensing arrangement.” See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N,
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.7 (1995), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm#t57 [hereinafter DOJ AND FTC IP
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES]. 
 163.  Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property 
Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 521 (2003). 
 164.  Ryan Davis, ‘Patent Troll’ Suits Face New Obstacles at the ITC, LAW360 (Feb. 11, 
2014, 7:21 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/509094/patent-troll-suits-face-new-obstacles-
at-itc.
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a patent, show that at least one product practicing the patent exists.166
Although this decision is not binding on federal courts, it is significant 
in two respects. First, it recognizes that the constructive enablement 
standard, which allows patents in the absence of practicing products, 
may result in patent enforcement for monetary gain rather than to pro-
mote competition. Second, the ITC decision finds a way to restrict 
NCE activity in a way that is not disruptive to the patent system, by 
limiting standing rather than seeking to change the enablement stand-
ard in patent law. 
Similar to patent and contract law, the antitrust doctrine alone is 
not sufficient to support license alienability because it does not pro-
vide all the necessary doctrinal mechanisms for doing so. In the con-
text of patents, one applicable antitrust provision is the anti-
monopolization provision articulated in Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act.167 However, in order to show that a practice is anti-competitive 
under the Sherman Act, a patentee must have fraudulently procured 
its patent.168 Additionally, to prevail in a Section 2 argument under, for 
example, the essential facilities doctrine,169 both parties must be com-
petitors.170 Neither is necessarily the case with NCEs. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, then, the antitrust-based ap-
proach recognizes that NCEs, as non-competitors, should enjoy a 
narrower field of opportunities to bring infringement suits and shows 
that it is possible to implement judicial rules that accomplish this policy 
objective without disrupting the law of patentability.171 These two prin-
ciples inform the argument for license alienability. 
 166.  Id.
 167.  15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2004). 
 168.  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013) (citing Walker Pro-
cess Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965) 
(“[E]nforcement of a patent procured by fraud may violate the Sherman Act”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 169.  Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. & J. Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 
1190–91 (1999) (“A monopolist in control of a facility essential to other competitors must provide 
reasonable access to that facility if it is feasible to do so”); see generally Elaine Johnston, Intel-
lectual Property as an ‘Essential Facility’, PRACTISING LAW INST. (2004), http://jp.white-
case.com/files/Publication/c93f2d08-b2c5-492c-804b-
bd5dc51f74ed/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/15b3c953-2983-4ede-a055-
c17043b5c00d/00817_Elaine_Johnston_byline.pdf (discussing limited applicability of the es-
sential facilities doctrine to intellectual property). 
 170.  See, e.g., Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 837 (1952). 
 171. Actavis Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (holding that a pharmaceutical substance patentee’s 
attempt to set higher-than-average licensing fees in a settlement agreement with competitor 
was not immune from antitrust scrutiny, even if the agreement’s anticompetitive effects fell within 
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IV. ARGUING LICENSE ALIENABILITY 
A. Restraints on Alienability as Patent Misuse in Light of Case 
Law
This section reconciles the proposed rule with case law, presents 
an additional doctrine (shop right) to supplement the Princo rule anal-
ysis, and discusses procedural aspects of litigating alienability of pa-
tent licenses to business successors of the licensee. 
1. NCE Activity as an Anti-Competitive Practice under the 
Princo Rule 
Attempts by non-creative entities to exclude business successors 
of a licensee by enforcing anti-assignment clauses run counter to the 
principle of patent misuse, which seeks to protect market participants 
from anti-competitive actions by third parties. The doctrine of patent 
misuse applies when an improper attempt exists on the part of the 
patent holder to extend the scope of the patent, and such attempts 
are especially likely to be considered improper if they contravene an-
titrust law.172 Because patent grants create monopolies, the misuse 
doctrine is intended to check the temptation to manipulate the intel-
lectual property system to ends that it was never intended to serve.173
In the licensing context, conduct that has been challenged as patent 
misuse includes tying arrangements,174 territorial, field-of-use, and 
customer restrictions,175 grantbacks that are broader in scope than 
improvements to the licensed patents,176 and bad-faith enforcement 
of intellectual property rights.177
A typical anti-assignment clause in a patent license will prohibit 
the right or power to assign the contract to third parties.178 Therefore, 
of particular interest here is the application by courts of the doctrine 
of patent misuse in the context of contracts that attempt to unduly 
exceed the scope of the patent right. 
 172.  AM. BAR. ASSOC., SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MISUSE:
LICENSING AND LITIGATION 1, at 1 (2000) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MISUSE].
 173.  Id. at 127–28. 
 174.  Id. at 75. 
 175.  Id. at 82–84. 
 176.  Id. at 86–87. 
 177.  Id. at 66. 
 178.  Jessica L. Braeger, Antiassignment Clauses, Mergers, and the Myth About Federal 
Preemption of Application of State Contract Law to Patent License Agreements, 50 DRAKE L.
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CAFC, in Princo, held that attempts to impose conditions on a 
licensee that exceed the scope of the patent right constitute patent 
misuse.179 CAFC also noted that, if patent misuse is established on 
public policy grounds, the underlying contract is rendered unenforce-
able.180
At the same time, however, courts have also upheld non-assign-
ability clauses and refused to recognize NCE licensing arrangements 
as anti-competitive. For example, in In Re CFLC the Ninth Circuit held 
that a patent holder had an exclusive right to prevent such an assign-
ment,181 and the United States District Court for the Eastern District, 
in an unpublished opinion, refused to recognize NCE patent infringe-
ment allegations as patent misuse.182 Additionally, CAFC, in Sanofi-
Aventis v. Apotex, Inc., has recently held that the defense of patent 
misuse is not available to a presumptive infringer simply because a 
patentee engages in some kind of wrongful commercial conduct, even 
conduct that may have anticompetitive effects.183
Notwithstanding these recent decisions, the proposal that anti-
assignment clauses in NCE licensing contracts constitute patent mis-
use under the Princo rule is not inconsistent with case law. The In Re 
CFLC decision, for example, pertained to a situation where the licen-
see declared bankruptcy, and, in this scenario, it was appropriate to 
resolve the conflict between the patent holder and the licensee’s suc-
cessor in favor of the patent holder because the patent holder was in 
a better position than the licensee’s debtor to use the patent license 
in a productive fashion. 
In Sanofi-Aventis, the parties were competitors disputing the ex-
tent to which statutorily permissible184 manufacture and sales of ge-
neric medication constituted infringement. Further, the court 
 179.  Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1318–30 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 180.  Id. at 1328 (“When [] contractual conditions violate public policy, however, as in the 
case of price-fixing conditions and tying restraints, the underlying patents become unenforcea-
ble, and the patentee loses its right to sue for infringement or breach of contract.”); accord.,
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Ink Techs. Printer Supplies, LLC, No. 1:10-CV-564, 2014 WL 1276133, at 
*6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2014).  
 181.  In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 680 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Because federal law governs the 
assignability of nonexclusive patent licenses, and because federal law makes such licenses 
personal and assignable only with the consent of the licensor, the . . . license is not assumable 
and assignable in bankruptcy . . . .”). 
 182.  Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-CV-00740, 2013 WL 6682981 
(E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2013). 
 183.  Sanofi-Aventis v. Apotex, Inc., 659 F.3d 1171, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
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distinguished Princo, noting that wrongful commercial conduct at is-
sue was a failure to comply with notice requirements rather than at-
tempts to unduly enlarge the scope of the patented invention.185
2. Linking License Alienability with Patent Misuse though the 
Shop Right Doctrine 
The shop right doctrine presents an additional mechanism to ar-
gue that NCE restrictions on license alienability to licensee’s business 
successors constitute patent misuse. This doctrine supports both the 
Princo rule and license alienability, and further underscores the im-
portance of considering the licensee and its successors’ ability to pro-
ductively use a patent. 
The first prong of the Princo rule posits that unduly extending pa-
tent scope constitutes patent misuse.186 This Note argues that re-
strictions on license assignments to business successors in effect 
unduly extend the reach of an NCE patent, and this proposal finds 
support in the doctrine of shop right, rooted in patent law. Although a 
shop right confers on the licensee the right to practice a patent but 
not to assign it,187 courts have made an exception to this rule when 
there is “a complete succession of the entire business and good will 
of [the licensee]”.188
Policy principles underlying license alienability are discussed, for 
example, in Speedplay, Inc. v. Beebop, Inc., where CAFC noted, in 
dictum, that a patent owner does not hold an absolute right to withhold 
permission to the licensee to assign the license to a third party.189 The 
court interpreted the parties’ licensing agreement, which stipulated 
that the right to assign shall not be withheld “unreasonably,” to mean 
that the only reasonable basis for prohibiting assignment of the li-
cense would be an impediment to the owner’s consideration for en-
tering the original agreement.190 Such consideration, as determined 
 185.  Sanofi-Aventis, 659 F.3d at 1182 (“‘[T]he key inquiry under the patent misuse doctrine 
is whether . . .  the patentee has impermissibly broadened the physical or temporal scope of the 
patent grant and has done so in a manner that has anticompetitive effects.’ BMS’s failure to 
disclose the oral side deal with Apotex, and its false certification to the FTC regarding the same, 
in no way broadened the scope of the 265 patent grant.” (quoting Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 186.  Princo, 616 F.3d at 1318–30. 
 187.  Ushakoff v. United States, 179 Ct. Cl. 780 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
 188.  Neon Signal Devices v. Alpha-Claude Neon Corp., 54 F.2d 793, 796 (W.D. Pa. 1931). 
 189.  Speedplay, Inc. v. Bepop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 1251–52 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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by the court, consisted largely of protecting the owner’s ongoing roy-
alty stream.191
If we apply the reasoning articulated in Speedplay to the hypo-
thetical scenario discussed in the Introduction, where the licensee, 
Small Inventor, Inc., unsuccessfully attempted to transfer its license 
rights to a business successor, Medical Devices, Inc., it becomes 
clear that permitting the licensee to assign its contract, presumably 
on the same terms, would not adversely impact the patent owner’s 
royalty revenues. Any other conclusion would effectively afford the 
patent owner a benefit not commensurate with the scope of the patent 
at issue by allowing the owner to exercise undue influence over the 
licensee’s business decisions. Such an outcome would constitute pa-
tent misuse as defined by CAFC in Princo.192
The second prong of the Princo rule states that misuse in the air 
is not sufficient.193  Similar to the Ninth Circuit, the District Court for 
the Eastern District, in Intellectual Ventures, refused to uphold the 
doctrine of patent misuse as a defense to allegations of bad-faith pa-
tent enforcement because the attempted licensor, an NCE, attempted 
to enforce a portfolio of patents. The prospective licensee pointed to 
this activity in the aggregate rather than to any specific patent to sup-
port its allegations of bad-faith enforcement, and at issue was the ap-
propriateness of claiming patent misuse by the attempted licensee 
before a license was finalized.194 The court, citing a long line of prec-
edent, noted that allegations of “misuse in the air” were not suffi-
cient.195
The facts, however, are radically different when an established 
licensor-licensee relationship exists. Because there was not a clearly 
identifiable patent in Intellectual Ventures, the court concluded that 
the prospective licensor had not demanded from the prospective li-
censee any “concessions beyond the monopoly power created by an 
enforceable patent,”196 which, as discussed above, is not the case 
when an unqualified right to withhold an assignment to a business 
 191.  Id.
 192.  Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1318–30 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 193.  Id. at 1329.
 194.  Intell. Ventures I LLC v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. 1:13-CV-00740, 2013 WL 
6682981, at *9 (E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 2013) (“Ulterior or bad motives do not deprive a patent holder 
of its right to enforce a patent; and a patent misuse defense cannot be based on ‘misuse in the 
air.’ Rather, ‘[t]he misuse must be of the patent in suit.’”). 
 195.  Id.
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successor would effectively exceed the scope of such monopoly 
power.
B. Procedural Aspects of Arguing Illegality of Anti-Assignment 
Clauses through Patent Misuse 
1. Timing197
This Note proposes expanding the doctrine of patent misuse to 
support claims that anti-assignment clauses in patent licenses, when 
the licensor is an NCE, may be unduly restrictive because they ex-
ceed the scope of the patent. The first question with respect to proce-
dural aspects of bringing such claims is the question of timing, and, 
inasmuch as timing affects ownership of the disputed license, the re-
lated question is who can bring an action. 
Complaints seeking to invalidate restrictions on assignment 
could be brought before or after infringement is alleged.198 If brought 
pre-infringement, the licensee or its successor could seek a declara-
tory judgment invalidating the restrictive clause in the licensing agree-
ment.
If brought post-infringement, the licensee or its successor could 
bring a counter-claim seeking to invalidate the clause or, in the alter-
native, supplement its defense of patent unenforceability.199
Additionally, the licensee or its successor could bring such claims 
or counter-claims either before or after the change-of-control transac-
tion occurs. As such, the analytical framework proposed here does 
not impose restrictions on either timing or the parties in suit. 
2. Jurisdiction and Choice of Law 
The second question related to procedure is jurisdiction and 
choice of law. The issue of alienability of patent licenses should be 
litigated in federal courts, similar to other patent-related disputes, and, 
notably, this approach does not conflict with existing jurisdictional law 
 197.  For an in-depth discussion see Andrew Schwerin, Declaratory Judgment Suits Against 
Patent Trolls, RIIPL INST. FOR INFO. POLICY & LAW (2014), http://riipl.rutgers.edu/andrew-schwe-
rin-declaratory-judgment-suits-against-patent-trolls/.  
 198.  See Jennifer R. Saionz, Declaratory Judgment Actions in Patent Cases: The Federal 
Circuit’s Response to Medimmune v. Genentech, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161 (2008) (discuss-
ing the “reasonable apprehension” standard relaxed in light of MedImmune’s “totality of the cir-
cumstances” test). 
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in either contracts or patents. While state contract law governs inter-
pretation of patent licenses,200 federal patent law controls on the issue 
of license alienability in order to promote innovation and because the 
analysis of license alienability issues is rooted in the law of intellectual 
property rights.201 CAFC successfully harmonized state contract law 
with the law of patents.202
Additionally, federal courts have jurisdiction over counter-claims 
or defenses to infringement.203 As to the choice of law, interpretation 
of the contract language as to the extent to which assignability is re-
stricted and determining whether a change-of-ownership transaction 
occurred would be a matter of state law,204 whether contractually stip-
ulated or not, and arguments related to establishing patent misuse on 
the ground of the presence of an anti-assignment clause in the license 
agreement could be interpreted under federal law of patents.205
V. RESPONSE TO COUNTERARGUMENTS 
Likely counterarguments to the proposal advanced in this Note 
include the following: first, NCE activity should not be limited because 
NCEs are valuable market players that provide much-needed liquidity 
in the market of intellectual property rights; second, patent misuse has 
already been unsuccessfully argued in the context of NCE licensing; 
third, the proposal may adversely affect non-practicing entities that 
add value, such as universities; and fourth, the proposal may run 
counter to the well-established principle of freedom of contract. These 
counterarguments are addressed below. 
 200.  Cincom Sys., Inc. v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431, 437 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that “state 
contract law will govern the interpretation of a license because a license is merely a type of 
contract.”). 
 201.  Id., see also In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 679 (9th Cir. 1996) (federal law must govern 
to prevent free assignability and to promote creativity); In re Alltech Plastics, Inc., 71 B.R. 686, 
689 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1987) (“Because ‘[t]he rights of the patent owner to license the use of 
his invention is [sic] a creature of federal common law False [i]t follows that questions regarding 
the assignability of patent licenses are controlled by federal law’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 202.  Karen E. Sandrik, Formal but Forgiving: A New Approach to Patent Assignments, 66 
RUTGERS L. REV. 299, 305 (2014). 
 203.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1338 (West 2011). 
 204.  See, e.g., Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1061 (2013) (refusing to interpret a legal 
malpractice claim, a matter of state law, under federal patent law because the federal issue 
needed to be “necessary for resolution,” “actually disputed,” “substantial,” and consistent with 
public policy); see also Ziff & Deming, supra note 50, at 3. 
 205.  Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting, however, 
a narrow application of misuse to limit patent scope because 28 U.S.C. § 1338 misuse is a 
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A. NCEs As Market Intermediaries 
Opponents of limiting NCE activity argue that NCEs provide mar-
ket liquidity.206 For example, one study, commissioned by the Federal 
Trade Commission, found that non-creative entities account for 75% 
of all activity in patent licensing markets.207 The same study, however, 
found that less than 25% of this licensing activity leads to innovation 
in industries that heavily rely on intellectual property.208
In other words, it is questionable whether the increased transac-
tion costs associated with procuring, managing and litigating patents 
are justified by patent commercialization facilitated by NCEs. Market 
intermediaries play an important role in facilitating property exchange 
but, as noted supra, the anticompetitive effects of such economic ac-
tivity must not exceed the aggregate benefits that market intermedi-
aries provide to the economy.209 Market disintermediation benefits 
both producers210 and consumers.211
The largest technology companies clearly view NCEs as a prob-
lem rather than as facilitators of commercial activity, as indicated by 
recent efforts of these companies to avoid infringement litigation by 
NCEs by entering alternative licensing arrangements with other oper-
ating entities that practice the patents they own. Defensive patent ag-
gregators and cross-licensing arrangements are examples of these 
efforts.212
Technology companies form alliances to jointly purchase patents 
from smaller inventors, thereby taking these patents off the market so 
as to prevent NCEs from acquiring and enforcing them. Technology 
 206.  See generally Hannibal Travis, Patent Alienability and Its Discontents, 17 TUL. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 109 (2014).   
 207.  Mark S. Popofsky & Michael D. Laufert, Patent Assertion Entities and Antitrust: Oper-
ating Company Patent Transfers, 12 AM. BAR. ASSOC.: THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 2 (2013). 
 208.  Id.
 209.  DOJ AND FTC IP ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 161, at § 3.4 (“The Agencies’ gen-
eral approach in analyzing a licensing restraint under the rule of reason is to inquire whether 
the restraint is likely to have anticompetitive effects and, if so, whether the restraint is reasonably 
necessary to achieve procompetitive benefits that outweigh those anticompetitive effects. . . .). 
 210.  ERIC J. ARNOULD ET AL., MARKET DISINTERMEDIATION AND PRODUCER VALUE CAPTURE:
THE CASE OF FAIR TRADE COFFEE IN NICARAGUA, PERU AND GUATEMALA 4 (2006), http://digital-
commons.unl.edu/marketingfacpub/11. 
 211.  Case Study: Dell—Distribution and Supply Chain Innovation, MARS (2011), 
http://www.marsdd.com/mars-library/case-study-dell-distribution-and-supply-chain-innovation/. 
 212.  Martha Belcher & John Casey, Hacking the Patent System: A Guide to Alternative 






      12/28/2015   14:43:02
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 208 Side B      12/28/2015   14:43:02
13 ONLEY FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/24/2015 9:25 PM
402 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 91:1
companies also form alliances aimed at creating common pools of 
patents. 
Once such initiative is Google’s License on Transfer (LOT) pro-
gram, which aims to reduce the number of patents available to 
NCEs.213 Under this program, participants agree to license, royalty-
free, their patent portfolios to each other, but agree that licenses will 
become enforceable only if a participant decides to transfer its patent 
portfolio to an NCE. Thus, participants intentionally encumber their 
intellectual property title with licenses to other operating entities, re-
ceiving, in exchange, an assurance that in the event some of these 
patents are transferred to NCEs, the risk of infringement litigation by 
NCEs against other LOT participants will dissipate because the pa-
tents will already have been licensed to these participants.214 In sum-
mary, technology companies aim to reduce the number of 
enforceable patents available to NCEs, thereby reducing liquidity, 
which shows that these companies see NCE activity as costly rather 
than beneficial to the industry.215
Notably, the LOT licensing agreement includes an exception stip-
ulating that licenses transferred to participants’ business successors 
rather than NCEs remain unenforceable as against other participants. 
Specifically, as articulated by Google, Inc., 
“[t]here are two principal exceptions where the transfer of patents 
will not trigger a license under the LOT Agreement. The first is a 
transfer of patents to another current LOT Network participant. The 
second is a transfer that is part of a legitimate M&A or spin-out ac-
tivity. . . . These exceptions allow companies sufficient room to uti-
lize and dispose of their intellectual property in ways that maintain 
value to support the growth and performance of their business,
while giving active participants a royalty-free license to protect them 
from patent sales to non-participants, e.g., PAEs.” (emphasis 
added).216
 213.  Id.
 214.  LOTNET, http://www.lotnet.com/lotnet-solution/index.cfm (last visited Aug. 9, 2015). 
 215.  Id. at http://www.lotnet.com/patent-assertion-problem/index.cfm  (“The balance of rev-
enue obtained by operating companies versus costs expended to defend against [NCEs] is 
orders of magnitude in favor of costs.”). 
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Consistent with the proposal advanced in this Note, the LOT 
agreement defines business successors as entities that assume own-
ership of a participant’s patents as a result of mergers, change-of-
control transactions, and spin-offs. 
In the event the successor chooses not to become a member of 
the LOT network within six months, the licenses simply expire. This 
provision is fully in accord with the proposal advanced in this Note in 
two ways: first, the industry views title encumbrances as harmful, ra-
ther than beneficial, to operating entities, and, second, the industry 
supports the free choice of successor companies to continue or ter-
minate the cross-licensing arrangement, with an apparent goal of min-
imizing the impact of title encumbrances on change-of-control 
negotiations and thus preserving the value of patents at issue. 
B. B&N v. MOSAID, Inc. As Distinguishable Legal Precedent 
Patent misuse has already been unsuccessfully argued in the 
context of NCE licensing. Barnes & Noble (B&N), a licensee of 
Google, Inc.’s Android™ operating system used in computer tablet 
technology, recently accused MOSAID, Inc., a patent aggregation al-
liance (an NCE) formed by Microsoft, Inc. and Nokia, Inc., of patent 
misuse. The alleged goal was to make Android™, and consequently 
B&N tablet computers, prohibitively expensive, and thus perpetuate 
Microsoft’s dominance in PC operating systems.217 After several 
rounds of unsuccessful licensing negotiations, Microsoft, Inc. brought 
suit, alleging that B&N infringed its patents.218 B&N brought a counter-
claim with the ITC alleging patent misuse as an affirmative defense to 
infringement.219 The ITC court did not find patent misuse.220
The proposal advanced in this Note is not inconsistent with the 
court’s reasoning. Notably, the court relied on the Princo rule stating 
that, first, misuse must be related to specific patents, and, second, 
the goal of the licensing activity must have been intended to broaden 
the scope of the patent.221 The court found that B&N failed to identify 
particular patents in controversy because Microsoft had attempted to 
 217.  In re Certain Handheld Elec. Computing Devices, Related Software, & Components 
Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-769, USITC Order No. 32 (Jan. 31, 2012) (order granting motion for 
summary determination). 
 218.  Id.
 219.  Id.
 220.  Id.
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license a portfolio without identifying each individual patent.222 This 
situation is drastically different from the scenario addressed in this 
Note, where a licensing agreement would already exist and, thus, the 
patent at issue would be clearly identifiable. Thus, a complaint or de-
fense brought by the licensee would not fail the patent-in-suit prong223
of the Princo test. 
Further, CAFC noted that B&N did not meet the second prong of 
the Princo test—undue extensions of scope of the patent.224 First, the 
court stated that, in light of case law,225 Microsoft’s attempt to extract 
high royalties was permissible because the doctrine of patent monop-
oly does not impose a ceiling on royalties.226 In the license assigna-
bility scenario, however, the monetary value of royalties due to the 
NCE would not be at issue. Rather, the proposal simply attempts to 
remove the barriers to the freedom of operation of the licensees and 
their successors. In fact, limiting NCE ability to negotiate with licensee 
successors would protect the NCE’s position—because one version 
of the proposal articulated in this Note would invalidate the anti-as-
signability clause rather than the entire licensing agreement, the NCE 
could continue receiving royalties from its licensee’s successor on the 
same terms as before.227
Second, the ITC court in MOSAID noted that Microsoft did not 
unduly expand the breadth of scope of its patents when it attempted 
to impose field-of-use restrictions on B&N by limiting operating sys-
tem versions and upgrades.228 In contrast, field-of-use restrictions are 
not at issue in regards to the licensor-licensee relationship. 
 222.  Id/
 223.  Id.
 224.  Id.
 225.  Id. (“A patent empowers the owner to extract royalties as high as he can negotiate with 
the leverage of that monopoly.” Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 33 (1964). Indeed, the patent 
laws even permit unilateral refusals to license patents. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 
1195, 1204 (2d Cir. 1981); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4). Accordingly, this is not misuse.”)   
 226.  Id. However, note that CAFC denounced the 25% rule. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft 
Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“This court now holds as a matter of Federal Circuit 
law that the 25 percent rule of thumb is a fundamentally flawed tool for determining a baseline 
royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation.”). 
Also, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013) created a multi-factor 
analysis to follow under § 271(d)(4). 
 227.  This would have passed the test articulated in Actavis. See Fed. Trade Comm’n. v. 
Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231. 
 228.  In re Certain Handheld Elec. Computing Devices, Related Software, & Components 
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Field-of-use restrictions arise when both parties to the agreement 
practice the technology covered by the patent at issue or when one 
practicing entity attempts to use its patents as a sword through an 
NCE.229 Because NCEs do not practice their patents, the first scenario 
involving two competitors in a licensor-licensee relationship is not 
within the scope of this proposal, and, with respect to the second sce-
nario, a distinct advantage of the proposal as articulated in this Note 
is that there is not a need to examine the provenance of the NCE to 
determine whether it was created by the licensee’s competitor. The 
restriction at issue is the anti-assignability provision rather than a 
field-of-use limitation, and our proposal borrows from the antitrust 
framework to extend the doctrine of patent misuse rather than rely on 
the antitrust doctrine exclusively as was done by B&N.230
In summary, the B&N argument in MOSAID required a showing 
of patent misuse to prove an antitrust violation by a competitor, and 
the court was understandably reluctant to make a policy decision on 
whether it was allowable for practicing entities to use patents against 
competitors.231 The scope of the issue presented in this Note, in con-
trast, is much narrower and aims to encourage corporate investment 
in innovation by making it easier for companies to acquire potentially 
profitable resources. To that end, field-of-use issues would not be 
raised, and the licensee’s argument for assignability would not fail the 
second prong of the Princo test. 
C. Effect on Non-Practicing but Value-Adding Entities 
Proponents of the free-market approach to regulating NCEs ar-
gue that any restrictions on NCE activity will adversely impact non-
practicing entities that add value—for example, universities.232 In-
 229.  See Intellectual Property Misuse, supra note 172. 
 230.  Certain Handheld Elec. Computing Devices, Related Software, & Components 
Thereof, Order No. 32, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-769 (Jan. 31, 2012) (order granting motion for 
summary determination). 
 231.  For an examination of possible arguments to support the assertion that transfers of IP 
assets to NCEs may violate antitrust laws, see POPOFSKY & LAUFERT, supra note 207.  
 232.  Dennis S. Corgill, Competitive Injury and Non-Exclusive Patent Licensees, 71 U. PITT.
L. REV. 641, 642–43 (2010). (“Consider, for example, a university that owns a patent on a med-
ical device invented by one of its professors. The university may choose not to practice the 
invention itself for the simple reason that the university does not have the requisite manufactur-
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deed, universities are in a position to conceive of inventions and re-
duce them to practice without commercializing them. Instead, they 
may assign or license their patents to private-industry entities.233
This proposal, however, would not negatively impact productive 
non-practicing entities for several reasons. First, a key strength of the 
proposal is its focus on contracting activity between NCEs and prac-
ticing entities rather than on patent validity. A targeted solution for 
curtailing NCE activity eliminates the need to invalidate the entire pa-
tent held by the NCE: as explained above, the argument that re-
strictions on assignability are illegal can be raised outside the context 
of raising patent misuse as a defense to effectuate patent invalidity in 
infringement litigation. This can be done in two ways: first, the licen-
see may seek a declaratory judgment pertaining only to its contract 
with the NCE and not to the underlying patent.234 Second, patent mis-
use supports unenforceability rather than patent invalidity.235
As a result, the outcome of the analytical process proposed here 
would have no impact on the legal status of non-creative entities or 
on the requirements for patentability. Non-creative entities, including 
universities, could continue to operate without the need to show evi-
dence of use in order to obtain or retain rights to a patent. 
Arguably, making it more difficult for NCEs to control transfera-
bility of licenses to their patents could make these entities unwilling to 
procure patents from universities.236 However, it is unclear whether 
“patent trolls” are big purchasers of university patents, especially in 
light of the fact that university research projects are funded by private 
industry and government,237 which increases the likelihood that these 
entities will become owners of the patents resulting from such re-
search, either by contract or statutorily,238 which, in turn, will create 
 233.  Id. (“That leaves the university with the option of licensing. Depending upon a variety 
of economic circumstances, the university may opt for non-exclusive licensees. For example, 
the university may not want a single, exclusive licensee to obtain monopoly power, which would 
permit the exclusive licensee to raise price and restrict output. Instead, the university may prefer 
a system of non-exclusive licensees who will compete on price and expand output.”). 
 234.  28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (West 2010). 
 235.  35 U.S.C.A. § 282(b)(1) (West 2012). 
 236.  See Hannibal Travis, supra note 206. 
 237.  ASSOC. OF AM. UNIVS., UNIVERSITY RESEARCH: THE ROLE OF FEDERAL FUNDING (Jan. 
2011), http://www.aau.edu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=11588 [hereinafter AMERICAN 
UNIVERSITIES]. 
 238.  35 U.S.C.A. § 202(c)(4) (The university may elect to retain rights, provided that it timely 
files a patent.  However, “with respect to any invention in which the [funded party] elects rights, 
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title encumbrances that would make such purchases unattractive for 
“patent trolls”. In fact, 60% of university research spending comes 
from federal funding.239
D. Freedom of Contract 
Another potential counterargument is rooted in the principle of 
freedom of contract, which stipulates that private entities should be 
free to enter contracts without judicial or government interference.240
The proposal articulated in this Note, however, is not contrary to this 
principle. NCE licensing contracts cannot be considered contracts of 
adhesion,241 which are subject to invalidity under the doctrine of un-
conscionability, because both the NCE and its licensee are likely busi-
ness entities sophisticated enough to bargain over the terms of the 
contract. 
An argument could be made, however, that licensees are not free 
to refuse to enter licensing agreements because they would otherwise 
be subject to infringement actions. For example, an accused infringer 
recently brought a counter-claim of extortion, which was rejected by 
CAFC in Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank 
on the ground that the patent owner’s filing of an infringement lawsuit 
did not rise to the level of extortion sufficient to support an extortion 
claim.242 At the same time, the law of patents is firmly rooted in the 
doctrines of patent monopoly and market choice, and neither of these 
doctrines provides mechanisms for prospective licensees to reject re-
strictions on license assignment to third parties in license negotia-
tions. Therefore, a narrowly tailored judicial solution articulated in this 
Note could fill the gaps by helping licensees challenge restrictions on 
assignment without disrupting the patent system and without disrupt-
ing freedom of contract; the proposal does not seek to invalidate en-
tire license agreements. 
practice or have practiced for or on behalf of the United States any subject invention throughout 
the world.”). 
 239.  See AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES, supra note 237 (“In 2009, [the federal government sup-
ported] about $33 billion of universities’ total annual R&D spending of $55 billion”). 
 240.  W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 241.  Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1173, 1176–77 (1983) (a contract of adhesion is standard form contract presented on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis). 
 242.  Content Extraction and Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 776 F.3d 
1343, 1351 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Treating meritless litigation as form of extortion punishable 
under RICO would substantially chill even valid court petitioning . . . .” (citing Deck v. Engi-
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Another counterargument is potential liability for tortious interfer-
ence with contractual relations.243 When a corporate transfer occurs 
by operation of law or despite the license holder’s objections, the busi-
ness successor would not be held liable. Tortious interference, im-
portantly, requires a deprivation of the contract holder of its 
consideration.244 In this case, no such deprivation would occur be-
cause the NCE would be free to agree to continue receiving royalties 
from the business successor on the same terms. The NCE’s position, 
therefore, would not be compromised. In a similar vein, no disruption 
of a business relationship245 would occur because the successor 
would be free to assume the licensee’s contract and because the li-
censee is unlikely to enter a contract that reduces rather than in-
creases revenues from practicing the invention. 
In addition, the proposal articulated in this Note would not disrupt 
the existing jurisdictional framework. Although contract issues are a 
matter of state law,246 it is not inconceivable that licensees may seek 
redress in federal courts that have jurisdiction over patent matters. In 
fact, federal courts, in adjudicating these disputes, could apply con-
tractually agreed upon choice-of-law provisions247 stipulated by the 
NCE and the licensee or its successor. 
CONCLUSION 
Non-creative entities contribute to rising costs of innovation by 
contractually requiring their licensees to seek NCE consent to subse-
quent license transfers. However, while courts are working to develop 
solutions to address this problem, drastic changes to the patent sys-
tem are not desirable. One possible way of gradually limiting the reach 
of NCEs is to expand the doctrine of patent misuse, which supports 
the unenforceability defense to patent infringement, to construe re-
straints on alienation of patent licenses as patent misuse under the 
Princo248 rule. This approach is consistent with substantive and pro-
cedural requirements of both federal patent law and state contract 
law. Additionally, it is consistent with the case law on the treatment of 
 243.  PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 978 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984). 
 244.  Id. at 989 (the defendant must cause the interference and the resulting loss). 
 245.  See, e.g., McGreevy v. Daktronics, Inc., 156 F.3d 837 (8th Cir. 1998) (interference with 
business relations). 
 246.  Cincom Sys., Inc. v. Novelis Corp., 581 F.3d 431, 437 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 247.  SOFTWARE CONTRACTS, supra note 87, at 87. 





      12/28/2015   14:43:02
37288-ckt_91-1 Sheet No. 212 Side A      12/28/2015   14:43:02
13 ONLEY FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/24/2015 9:25 PM
2016] PATENT LICENSING IN SOFTWARE AND ELECTRONICS 409 
IP licensees. Finally, the proposed approach is tailored with a preci-
sion sufficient to minimize shock to the patent system because it 
avoids the question of patent invalidity and does not seek to alter the 
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